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Dear Clerk:
Please be advised that a "pertinent and significant" case
recently issued by the Utah Court of Appeals has bearing on the
instant case. That o*se is Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and
Warehouse, Inc., No. 920434-CA filed on April 1 , 3 994, and reported
at 236 Utah

Advanced

Reports

24.

The case addressed the issue r a i s e d on pages 2-3 and 19 of
Appellee's Brief on the obligation of Appellant to "marshal all
relevant evidence presented at trial which tends to support the
findings.", quoting Slattery v. Covey Company, Inc., 857 P.2d 243,
246 (Ut. App. 1993), and the consequences of failure to do so.
This issue was also raised in Appellee's Motion for Summary
Disposition, page 5, to which the Court reserved its ruling.
Appellee believes the Oneida case is determinative < .
appeal.
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Loni F, DeLand, Esq., Counsel for Appellant
Bruce L. Dawson, Esq., Counsel for Appellant
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CASE NO. 930667-CA
ROBERT D. SHOWALTER, dba
ROCKY MOUNTAIN DRILLING,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
CANNON STRUCTURES, INC.,
JOHN P. CANNON,
Defendants/Appellees.
BRIEF OF APPELLEES

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k).

PARTIES
Defendant John Cannon died in November 1993.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court err in finding the drill rig had a reasonable market value of

$97,000?
2.

Did the trial court err in declining to award Showalter damages for speculative lost

future profits?
1

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
In his "Standard of Appellate Review," Showalter admits, "The trial court found
[Appellant's] damages ... to be $97,000. It is this finding of the trial court that is the basis of
this appeal." The Court in Slatterv v. Covev & Co.. Inc.. 857 P.2d 243, 246 (Utah App. 1993)
stated the general standard of review applicable to this appeal:
An appellant challenging factual findings faces a substantial burden. Trial court's
findings of fact will be affirmed if they are "based on sufficient evidence, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's construction." In order
to prevail, "the challenging party must marshal all relevant evidence presented at
trial which tends to support the findings." That party must then show that these
same findings are "so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the
evidence,' thus making them clearly erroneous." The trial court's conclusions of
law "are accorded no particular deference; we review them for correctness."
[Citations omitted; emphasis in original]
The standard is similarly stated in Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467, 470
(Utah 1989):
[A] trial court's findings of fact are given deferential review. Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a) provides, "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility
of the witnesses." Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). To successfully attack a trial court's
findings of fact, an appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the
findings and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings against an attack
under the rule 52(a) standard.
The appellate court may affirm the trial court on any proper ground.

Weber v.

Snvderville West. 800 P.2d 316, 320 (Utah App. 1990). The appellate court begins its analysis
with the trial court's findings of fact, not with the appellant's view of the facts it claims the trial
court should have found. Christensen v. Munns. 812 P.2d 69, 73 (Utah App. 1991). If an
appellant does not properly marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes the record
adequately supports the findings of the trial court. The appellate court also implies reasonable

2

unstated findings made by the trial court. Hall v. Hall. 858 P.2d 1018, 1025 (Utah App. 1993);
Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill. 849 P.2d 602, 605 (Utah App. 1993).
"[Evaluation of the weight and credibility of testimony and evidence is a matter for the
trier of fact." Morgan v. Morgan. 854 P.2d 559, 563 (Utah App. 1993). It is the province of
the trial court to assess the credibility of witnesses, and the appellate court will not second-guess
the trial court where there is a reasonable basis to support its findings. Reed v. Reed. 806 P.2d
1182, 1184 (Utah 1991).
The cases Showalter cites in his "Standard of Appellate Review" follow the standards set
forth above. See Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares. 850 P.2d 487, 489 (Utah App. 1993) ("Findings
of Fact . . . shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous and due regard shall be given the
opportunity of the Trial Judge to judge the credibility of the witnesses. . .

We review the

evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings and affirm if there is a reasonable
basis for doing so."); GUlmor v. Gmmor. 745 P.2d 461, 462 (Utah App. 1987) ("[TJhis Court
views the evidence and all the inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom in a light most
supportive of the trial court's findings. ... If there is a reasonable basis in evidence, a trial
court's award of damages will be affirmed on appeal.").

PERTINENT STATUTES / REFERENCES
Utah R.Civ.Proc. 52(a).
California Business & Professions Code § 7028, § 7031
California Labor Code § 1020-1024
23 CAL JUR Damages § 68, § 81

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

In or about 1982, Krupp Manufacturing Company in West Germany built a

prototype drill rig for the government of Czechoslovakia. The truck which carries the drill rig
was a Czechoslovakian truck. West German export restrictions prevented the sale. Krupp tried
unsuccessfully for several years thereafter to sell the drill rig on the open market. [R. 236 127;
Tr. 132, 142-44, 147, 161, 176, 287-289, 293, 477]
2.

The drill rig was a one-of-a-kind prototype drill rig which had not yet been fully

designed and constructed. It was a demonstrator. The drill rig was overweight, and although
designed to be self-transportable, could not legally be self-transported on the U.S. Interstate
highway system. In Europe, it could be driven on roads. Some but not all states might allow
its self-transportation on non-interstate roads, but transporting the drill rig while avoiding the
interstate system is problematic. Therefore, transporting the drill rig requires the expense of a
tractor and lowboy trailer, and special hauling permits. There is no factory support for the drill
rig, and parts are not available from the manufacturer. At least some of the parts needed to
repair the drill rig are not commercially available, and would need to be custom manufactured.
The difficulty in obtaining parts increases both the cost of parts and the down time for repairs.
There are no factory specifications; this increases the risk that any needed repairs will not be
adequate. The drill rig was sold without warranty. As a result, the drill rig is less marketable
than commercially available drill rigs. [R. 219-222, R. 236 1 28; Tr. 136, 160-164, 223-224,
284-290, 331, 334-335, 391-393, 478]
3.

Krupp originally attempted to sell the drill rig for an asking price of over

$700,000, but was unable to find any buyers at that price. Krupp got out of the business because
they could not sell such rigs. At one time Krupp leased the drill rig to a drilling company in
Germany, who after field testing the drill rig chose not to buy it. In fact, the drill rig had been
4

so used or attempted to be used that it had to be repainted as part of the sale. [R. 220 1 7; Tr.
145, 161, 199-200]
4.

Stanley Anderson owns a long-established company which performs drilling, and

also manufactures drill rigs. Krupp offered to sell Anderson the drill rig for $200,000, but
Anderson was not interested at that price. He might have paid $80,000 if Krupp had offered it
to him at that price. The drill rig was not durable according to Anderson. Brand-name drill rigs
with performance features comparable to the Krupp drill rig, but without its disadvantages, are
commercially available.

Anderson sold one such commercially available domestically

manufactured drill rig on the open market for $200,000. [R. 609, Anderson dep. 5-8, 10, 13]
5.

Krupp then sought the highest price it could get for the drill rig. Krupp offered

to sell the drill rig to Carl "Pete" Martin for $250,000. Showalter learned Krupp was willing
to sell the drill rig for $250,000, but Showalter was not interested in buying the drill rig at that
price. Krupp later dropped the price to $180,000, then to $150,000, then again to $120,000.
Martin went to West Germany to look the drill rig over. In 1990 Krupp finally sold Martin the
equipment at a price of $45,000 for the drill rig itself, $35,000 for the carrier truck, and $7,000
for spare parts and a drill tools kit. Martin also paid $10,000 for customs and shipping charges,
for a total of $97,000.
6.

[Tr. 148, 164, 176-177, 209-210, 397, 446, 474-475; R. 433]

Showalter loaned Martin the money to make the purchase, secured by a

Promissory Note, Security Agreement and a UCC-1 Financing Statement. In the loan documents
Showalter placed a value of $97,000 on the drill rig. The mutual intent was that Martin, not
Showalter, would buy and own the rig, and that Showalter's only interest was to receive
repayment of his $97,000 loan to Martin. [Tr. 388, 448, 474-75; R. 459, R. 618, Exhibit 51]
7.

Martin and Showalter intended that Martin would pay Showalter off from income

Martin anticipated making from work using the drill rig. [Tr. 388, 393-394, 467-448]
5

8.

During the time Martin owned the drill rig he used it only on a single project

known as the "Redlands" or "Ladd" project. Showalter was not involved in that project. In
order to get even that work Martin "bought" the job from another drilling subcontractor, Martin's
brother, for $40,000. The Redlands project was "a real hard job," and the drill rig could not
handle the work. Although Martin tried to line up several other potential jobs, he was unable
to obtain more work for the drill rig. [Tr. 266-267, 390, 393-395, 428-431, 449, R. 431 115]
9.

After Martin took possession of the drill rig from Krupp, Martin (NOT Showalter)

spent some $12,000 in maintenance, repairs and changes to make the drill rig more serviceable
to him. Among other things, Martin regeared the rig to slow its drilling speed down to his
personal preferences. The repair and maintenance included trying to stop leaking hydraulic
fluids. In fact the leaking continued. [Tr. 152, 225-228, 430-431, 434; R. 431 11 15-16]
10.

Even at a purchase price of $97,000 Martin failed to make enough income from

the drill rig to pay Showalter, so Showalter took over ownership of the drill rig. [Tr. 199, 335,
388-389, 474-75]
11.

Showalter wanted to sell the drill rig for what he had invested in it, $97,000, but

was willing to let Martin try putting it to work in the meantime. [Tr. 474-475, 479-480; R. 431
117]
12.

Showalter never received any offers to buy the drill rig. [Tr. 481-482; R. 431 1

13.

In 1991 Showalter employed Martin to work the drill rig on a contract with

19]

Cannon in Kayenta, Arizona, which was again referred from Martin*s brother. This was the one
and only job on which Showalter d/b/a Rocky Mountain Drilling used the drill rig. Prior to that
time, Mr. Martin had used it on the Ladd or Redlands job. [Tr. 19, 229, 450, 460-461, 481]
14.

Showalter's business was new and not well established. [R. 431 1 20]
6

15.

Showalter never made any profit doing business as Rocky Mountain Drilling. In

over one and one-half years the drill rig was available to Showalter, he continuously lost money
on the rig. Rocky Mountain Drilling's expenses always exceeded its income. Showalter
speculated on what "could" happen in the future. He did not rent a drill rig or even attempt to
rent a drill rig after the accident. [Tr. 462-464, 475-476, 480-481; R. 431 1 18]
16.

In early December of 1991, Cannon contracted with Showalter to transport the

drill rig from Kayenta, Arizona to a road under construction in California, for which Showalter
d/b/a Rocky Mountain Drilling had a drilling subcontract with Coast-Geo Construction Co.
Showalter saw only the final page of his 13-page contract, and has no knowledge of the contents
of the first twelve pages. Although the contract provided, H All work on a rental/hourly basis not
to exceed $47,880,M Showalter did not know what his contractual hourly rate was. Showalter
had no contractor's license in California, and was barred by California statute from contracting
or collecting for work using the drill rig without a license.

[R. 432 f 3; Tr. 465-468]

Hvdrotechv. Oasis, 803 P.2d 370 (CA 1991); Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons. 308 P.2d 713
(CA 1959); California Business & Professions Code § 7028, § 7031; California Labor Code §
1020-1024, all included herein. [See also, Tr. 498-500]
17.

While transporting the drill rig, Cannon lost the drill rig down a canyon, damaging

the drill rig. [R. 431 1 13; R. 236 1 25]
18.

As of early 1992, Cannon thought the rig could be repaired for about $100,000.

[R. 236 1 3 l ; T r . 84-89, 100]
19.

Showalter filed suit against Cannon, claiming damages to the rig of approximately

$1,000,000. [R. 1]
20.

Cannon decided to begin making repairs to the drill rig in an attempt to mitigate

potential losses. [Tr. 90-92] Showalter believed the rig was beyond repair. [Tr. 156]
7

21.

Cannon ultimately spent some $321,000 in remanufacturing domestic replacement

parts for the drill rig, [Tr. 103] creating a new rig, not a used rig, [R. 609, Anderson deposition,
page 24] but did not complete the repairs in a sufficient manner to be able to make acceptable
tender of a fully repaired drill rig to Plaintiff [R. 430 1 23]
22.

Showalter designated Jerry Rice, an expert in the value of drill rigs, to testify.

[R. 313] Showalter did not call his expert witness to testify at trial. [Tr. 1-547]
23.

For the value of the damage drill rig, Showalter presented the testimony of Martin

and of Joe Carl, who are longtime close personal friends and acquaintances of Showalter, and
of Showalter himself. Mr. Carl coordinated the purchase of the rig by Plaintiff for $97,000 and
accompanied Showalter to inspect the damaged rig. Mr. Carl had been out of the business since
1986, and was not familiar with today's prices. Their testimony was not founded on personal
knowledge as to the actual reasonable market value of the drill rig, but on the cost to buy a
production model replacement without the disadvantages of this particular rig. [R. 239 12, R.
433 1 1; Tr. 144, 148-149, 153, 159-162, 177, 192 lines 23-24, 199, 477, 483, See Facts 1-4
above]
24.

At trial, counsel for Cannon objected to Exhibit 47. The trial court sustained the

objection, and excluded Exhibit 47 from evidence. Showalter has not raised the trial court's
evidentiary ruling as an issue on appeal. [Tr. 368-369, 469-471] The appellate court should
disregard all attempts by Showalter to bolster his argument by referring to "facts" found only in
Exhibit 47, which is not part of the record either at trial or on appeal.

25.

The trial

court found Cannon to be 100 percent at fault in losing the drill rig down the canyon. [R. 430
11 2 and 5]
26.

An expert witness skilled in pricing of rigs and accepted by Showalter as being

"an economic rig expert," testified $97,000 was the fair market value of the drill rig at the time
8

of sale, and $62,250 was the fair market value of the drill rig at the time of the accident. [Tr.
282-294, 320; R. 617 Exhibit 43 included herein] Showalter depreciated the value four times
as quickly as the expert. [Tr. 401]
27.

The trial court found the damages to the drill rig amounted to a total loss of the

drill rig, and awarded Showalter damages of $97,000. [R. 431-429] This is the same value
Showalter placed on the drill rig. [Facts 6 and 11 above]
28.

Because the trial court found the drill rig was a total loss and awarded the full

reasonable market value of the drill rig to Showalter, the trial court awarded the salvage of the
drill rig to Cannon. [R. 557-558]
29.

Showalter d/b/a Rocky Mountain Drilling had done only one job using the drill

rig, and had never shown a profit. The trial court found Showalter's business was new and not
well established. It concluded Showalter's claim for lost profits was too speculative for recovery.
[Facts 14-16 above; R. 431-429]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court found the reasonable market value of the drill rig was $97,000, equivalent
to the purchase price (R. 43 M 21). This is the value placed by Plaintiff/Appellant before the
accident occurred. It is higher than the $80,000 another potential purchaser was willing to pay
and higher than the $62,500 value placed on it by an expert evaluation, the only independent
expert evaluation in evidence. Plaintiff/Appellant presented no evidence of market value ~ the
proper measure of damages.

Only Plaintiff/Appellant, Plaintiff/Appellant's agent and co-

purchaser Mr. Martin, and their close friend, Mr. Carl, gave opinions as to what the rig might
be "worth/

9

The trial court also found Showalter d/b/a Rocky Mountain Drilling's business was new
and unestablished, and concluded his claim for lost future profits was speculative. This finding
is also supported by the unchallenged substantial evidence in the record.

Plaintiff/Appellant

admits he never made any money in his business, "his costs being greater than his income/
"From April of 1990 to December of 1991 plaintiff attempted to use the rig on several
construction projects. Most of the projects fell through, but plaintiff was able to obtain work on
two projects. Plaintiff paid $40,000 to another company to obtain the other company's right to
the work."

[R. 431 1 15-20] The trial court's legal conclusions result from the proper

application of the law to those facts. This Court should affirm the judgment of the trial court.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING ON THE VALUE OF THE DRILL RIG
IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
This action is governed by California law. The measure of recovery for destruction of

personal property is as follows:
The proper measure of damages for the complete destruction of personal
property is the reasonable market value of the property destroyed. Neither the
cost of the property nor the expense of replacing it is the proper measure.
23 Cal Jur 2d Damages § 68; Tatone v. Chin Bing. 55 P.2d 933 (Cal. App. 1936), included
herein. The rule is similarly stated in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Mounteer. 136 Cal.Rptr. 280,
281 (Cal. App. 1977):
The general rule is that the measure of damages for tortious injury to personal
property is the difference between the market value of the property immediately
before and immediately after the injury, or the reasonable cost of repair if that
cost be less than the diminution in value.

10

Utah applies the same measure of damages. See Winters v. Charles Anthony. Inc.. 586 P.2d
453, 454 (Utah 1978):
The general rule is that damages awarded for personal property that is
taken or destroyed are based on the item's market value at the time of the taking
or destruction. Ordinarily, market value is defined as the price for which an
article is bought and sold and for which there exists a demand in the market place,
and the legal definition of that price is retail, not wholesale.
The trial court's damage award is based on the following Finding of Fact:
21.

Plaintiff has been damaged as follows:
a. For the total loss of the subject drill rig having a value of $97,000
(purchase price plus customs and shipping costs).

From this Finding of Fact, the trial court made the following Conclusion of Law:
4.
Plaintiff has sustained general damages for the value of the drill rig
in the sum of $97,000. [R. 431-430]
Appellant has failed to "marshal all relevant evidence presented at trial which tends to
support the findings," and to "show that these same findings are so lacking in support as to be
'against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous.'" Slattery. supra.
Appellant's argument that "The base purchase price and the customs charge is all of the evidence
that can be found to support the trial court's finding of damages" only demonstrates Showalter's
conscious disregard of the proper standard and supporting evidence. The price of the only sale
of the rig is sufficient to support the court findings. Slattery. supra.; Rembold, supra., Tatone,
supra. The additional evidence at trial and reasonable inference in support of the trial court's
findings included the following:
Krupp Manufacturing Co. built the drill rig in West Germany in or about 1982. The drill
rig was a one-of-a-kind prototype built for the Czechoslovakian government, and its design still
had not been completely worked out at the time of sale. While the drill rig had some desirable
features, it had many characteristics which adversely affected its marketability. Commercially
11

available brand-name drill rigs with comparable performance features, but without the
disadvantages of the Krupp drill rig, could be purchased on the open market for $200,000.
[Cannon Facts 1-4]1
Krupp sought the highest price it could get for the drill rig on the open market. It tried
to market the drill rig with an asking price of over $700,000, but found no buyers at that price.
It once leased the drill rig, but after using the drill rig in the field the lessee chose not to buy it.
Krupp dropped its asking price to $250,000, then to $180,000, then to $150,000, then to
$120,000, before it was finally able to find a buyer in Martin for $87,000, plus customs and
shipping charges. [Cannon Facts 3-5]
Showalter learned Krupp was asking $250,000 for the drill rig, but was not interested in
buying the drill rig at that price. [Cannon Fact 5]
One other potential buyer of the drill rig might have been willing to pay $80,000 for the
drill rig, but was not willing to pay $200,000. [Cannon Fact 4]
Showalter eventually loaned Martin $97,000 to buy the drill rig. [Cannon Fact 6]
After Martin bought the drill rig Martin (NOT Showalter) did some maintenance, repair
and modification work to the drill rig, at a cost of about $12,000. [Cannon Fact 9] There is no
evidence this maintenance expense had any effect on the reasonable market value of the drill rig,
and the trial court was within its discretion in excluding this repair expense from the value of the
drill rig.
Martin could not make enough money from the drill rig to pay Showalter off, so
Showalter took possession of the drill rig. Showalter intended to sell the drill rig to recover his
$97,000, but never received any offers for the drill rig. [Cannon Facts 8-12]
lM

Cannon Facts" refer to the statements of fact and citations contained in the
STATEMENT OF FACTS beginning at page 4 of this brief.
12

At trial, one expert witness testified the fair market value of the drill rig was $97,000 at
the time of purchase from Krupp, and the fair market value of the drill rig at the time of the
accident was $62,250. [Cannon Fact 26] Showalter designated another expert witness to testify
at trial as to the drill rig's value, but did not call that witness at trial. [Cannon Fact 22] The
trial court could reasonably have inferred that expert's testimony would have been unfavorable
to Showalter.
Showalter's so-called "overwhelming evidence" of a high value for the drill rig came from
the testimony of Martin and of Joe Carl, who are longtime close personal friends and
acquaintances of Showalter, and from Showalter himself. Mr. Carl had been out of the business
since 1986. Mr. Carl was not familiar with today's prices. Their testimony was not founded
on personal knowledge as to the actual reasonable market value of the drill rig. [Cannon Fact
23]
The only sale on which to assess the value of the drill rig was the sale to Martin at a total
cost of $97,000. Although Showalter apparently wanted to sell the drill rig, neither Showalter
nor Martin ever received any offers, for $600,000 or any similar amount. At most, testimony
of a value around $600,000 was speculation as to replacement cost, not reasonable market value.
Replacement cost is not the proper measure of damages, 23 Cal Jur 2d Damages § 68, supra.,
particularly of a one-of-a-kind prototype that could not be self-transporting because it was 10,000
pounds over its design weight. The trial court had the opportunity to consider the demeanor and
bias of Showalter's witnesses in assessing their credibility, and was within its discretion in giving
greater credence to the evidence supporting the trial court's finding.
Cannon spent a substantial amount to repair the drill rig, not because he thought the rig
was worth any particular amount, but because Showalter had sued Cannon for $1,000,000, there
was a genuine issue as to the actual value of the rig, Cannon thought the rig could be repaired
13

for $100,000, and he wanted to mitigate any potential losses. [Cannon Facts 18-21] It is
probable that the remanufactured rig is worth more than the original, because it has been
Americanized and all the used parts are now new.
No buyer was ever willing to pay $600,000, or $425,000, or even $180,000, for the drill
rig. Showalter himself was not willing to pay $250,000 when Krupp offered the drill rig at that
price.

Rather, the evidence shows that $200,000 (NOT $600,000) may have been the

approximate value of a domestically manufactured commercially available brand-name drill rig
with comparable performance features but with none of the disadvantages of the Czech designed
Krupp drill rig. The cost of replacing the used, prototype Krupp drill rig with a new, different,
commercially drill rig is not the proper measure of damages, nor is the cost of remanufacturing
a prototype the proper measure. 23 Cal Jur 2d Damages § 68. The trial court was within its
discretion in weighing the evidence as a whole and in rejecting $600,000 as the reasonable
market value of the drill rig at the time of the accident.
w

[M]arket value is defined as the price for which an article is bought and sold and for

which there exists a demand in the market place.w Winters, supra. The evidence showed a
demand for the drill rig in the marketplace, at a price around $80,000, not $200,000 and
certainly not $600,000. $97,000, which includes $7,000 for parts and $10,000 for customs and
shipping charges, is the maximum amount for which the drill rig was ever bought and sold. That
price was reached through arms-length negotiations between a willing buyer and a willing seller.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision, the trial
court's finding that the drill rig had a fair market value of $97,000 is well supported by
substantial evidence in the record. Showalter1 s appeal on this issue is without merit. The trial
court's judgment should be affirmed.
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H.

THE TRIAL COURTfS DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S LOST
PROFIT CLAIM AS SPECULATIVE IS SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

Lost future profits which are uncertain, speculative or remote are not recoverable:
Damages for loss of profits, whether for commission of a tort or breach
of a contract, may not be recovered where such profits are uncertain, speculative,
or remote.
23 Cal Jur 2d Damages § 80. A well established business may have a "track record" of
historically provable profits from which lost future profits may be established. In contrast,
because a new or unestablished business has no such track record, lost profits from a new
business are not susceptible of reasonable proof, and are too speculative to justify recovery.
Without a historical record of profit-making, there is no basis from which to conclude that the
new business would make any profit at all:
In allowing damages for loss of profits due to an injury to a business,
either by breach of a contract or commission of a tort, the law makes a distinction
between established and new business, in keeping with the general rule that such
damages, in order to be recoverable, must be reasonably certain and not
speculative or remote. . . . When the operation of an established business is
prevented or interrupted, either by a tort or a breach of contract, damages for loss
of prospective profits that might otherwise have been earned from operation of the
business are ordinarily recoverable since their occurrence and extent may be
ascertained with reasonable certainty from the working experience of the business,
from the past volume of business, and other provable data relevant to the probable
future sales of the business.
A loss of prospective profits from an unestablished business, either from
a breach of contract or the commission of a tort, is considered too uncertain to
merit compensation. A new business, in contradistinction to an established
concern, is regarded in law as simply an adventure, which presents a mere
possibility of earning future profits, and the courts will not, obviously, presume
that the profits anticipated from its commencement will actually be realized by the
parties to the venture. If one engages in a new industry, there are no provable
data of past business from which the fact can be legally deduced that anticipated
profits would have been realized.
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23 Cal Jur 2d Damages § 81 [emphasis added]. See MacMorris Sales Corp. v. Kozak. 69 Cal
Rptr. 719, 726 (Ct. App. 1968) ("Generally if a business is new it is not proper to give damages
for loss of prospective profits/)
The trial court's decision not to award Plaintiff damages for lost future profits is based
on the following Findings of Fact:
15.
From April of 1990 to December of 1991 plaintiff attempted to use
the rig on several construction projects. Most of the projects fell through, but
plaintiff was able to obtain work on two projects. Plaintiff paid $40,000 to
another company to obtain the other company's right to the work.
18.
Plaintiff never made any money from the rig, his costs being
greater than his income.
20.

Plaintiffs business was new and not well established.

From these Findings of Fact, the trial court made the following Conclusion of Law:
3.
Having found that plaintiffs business is new and unestablished, the
court concludes that plaintiffs business losses are too speculative for recovery:
In allowing damages for loss of profits due to an injury to a
business, either by breach of a contract or commission of a tort,
the law makes a distinction between established and new business,
in keeping with the general rule that such damages, in order to be
recoverable, must be reasonably certain and not speculative or
remote. . . .
A loss of prospective profitsfroman unestablished business,
either from a breach of contract or from the commission of a tort,
is considered too uncertain to merit compensation.
23 CAL. JUR. Damages 81 (citations omitted). (R. 431-430)
Evidence at trial supporting the trial court'sfindingson this issue included the following:
Rocky Mountain Drilling had performed only one contract in its entire existence, had
always operated at a loss, and had no immediate expectation of acquiring more work or ever
making a profit. Showalter did not even intend to stay in business, but intended to dispose of
the drill rig at the first available opportunity.

[Cannon Facts 8, 10, 13 and 15]
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Martin was supposedly experienced in the drilling industry. However, during the one and
one-half years he owned the drilling rig, Martin was only able to find work on one project where
he used the drill rig, and even that job had to be bought from his brother. Showalter was not
even involved in that project. The job was more difficult that Martin had expected, and the drill
rig was not ready to handle the work. Although Martin tried to line up several other potential
jobs, he was unable to obtain more work for the drill rig. Martin was unable to generate
sufficient income from the use of the drill rig to pay off, or even make payments, on his
$97,000 loan from Showalter. [Cannon Facts 8-10]
Showalter acquired the rig by loaning Martin the money to buy the drill rig, then taking
possession of the drill rig pursuant to his rights as a secured creditor when Martin, because of
his inability to make a profit, defaulted on his loan payments. Showalter did not acquire the drill
rig to use it on construction projects. Showalter wanted to sell the rig, but never received any
offers to buy the rig. [Cannon Facts 6, 10-12] The trial court's decision that the fair market
value of the drill rig was $97,000 is supportable. Point I, supra. It is reasonable to infer
Showalter would not have profited from the sale of the drill rig more than he was already
awarded.
Rocky Mountain Drilling used the drill rig on only one project. Showalter's argument
he made "a healthy profitw on that job is particularly surprising in light of Showalter's actual
testimony that he never made any profits as Rocky Mountain Drilling. During the time the drill
rig was available to Showalter, his expenses exceeded his income, and he lost money on the drill
rig. [Cannon Facts 13-15]
Showalter d/b/a Rocky Mountain Drilling had only one other contract lined up, to use the
drilling rig on a road project in California "on a rental/hourly basis not to exceed $47,880."
Showalter saw only the final page of his 13-page contract, and has no knowledge of his
17

obligations contained in the first 12 pages of his contract. Showalter does not even know what
his contractual hourly rate was. Only the final page of that contract is in evidence, and it would
be nothing more than guesswork whether the terms of that contract, which are not in evidence
and unknown even to Showalter, would have allowed Showalter to make a profit by performing
the contract. [Cannon Fact 16]
While Showalter gave his opinion as to what he anticipated in the way of future profits,
his opinion had no basis in any historical track record. Among other things Showalter1 s opinion
also assumed Showalter would obtain and profit from future work he had not yet even bid on,
yet alone been awarded contracts for. The trial court was within its discretion to disregard
Showalter1 s opinion as based on speculation.
Showalter had no California contractor's license. Showalter was prohibited by California
statute from entering into the contract or collecting on the contract. [Cannon Fact 16] Any
claim Showalter would have made a profit on that job is pure speculation. There is no evidence
Showalter would ever have been awarded another construction contract, or make a profit if a
contract was awarded. Most past projects had fallen through. [Cannon Fact 8] Any finding of
future profit would be based on speculation.
It was within the discretion of the trial court to disregard Showalter*s claims regarding
lost future profits as lacking in credibility, and as being to uncertain, speculative and remote.
The trial court's finding that Showalter d/b/a Rocky Mountain Drilling was a new and
unestablished business has ample support in the record. The trial court's conclusion that
Showalter*s claim for lost profits is speculative is also amply supported by the evidence, and
results from a proper application of the law to the facts. This Court should affirm the trial
court's decision not to award Showalter lost future profits.
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CONCLUSION
Showalterfs appeal is a head-on challenge to the trial court's findings of fact. He asks
this Court to substitute his view of the evidence for the trial court's findings. Showalter has
ignored both the standard of review and his burden of proof on appeal:
An appellant challenging factualfindingsfaces a substantial burden. Trial court's
findings of fact will be affirmed if they are "based on sufficient evidence, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's construction." In order
to prevail, "the challenging party must marshal all relevant evidence presented at
trial which tends to support the findings." That party must then show that these
same findings are "so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the
evidence,' thus making them clearly erroneous."
Siattery, supra.
The findings on the fair market value of the drill rig and the speculative nature of
Showalter's lost profits claim are amply supported by evidence in the record. This Court should
affirm the judgment of the trial court.

DATED this 2V day of January, 1994.

^ttqflneys for Appellee
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C o n t r a c t
Between

Mr Carl (Pete) Martin
2985 West, 1820 South
Vernal/ Utah 84078 USA
Telephone 801 789 7223

on t h e one side
and
Krupp Maschinentechnik GmbH
HelenenstraBe 149
4300 Essen Germany
t h e following c o n t r a c t h a s been concluded:
1.

Mr. Martin has bought and Krupp has s o l d a demonstrator
Krupp D r i l l i n g Machine KDM 12-150
a s inspected at Krupp's premises. Mr. Martin i s aware of
t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s u n i t i s a one of a kind machine.
The p r i c e i s US D o l l a r s 45.000,- ( f o r t y f i v e thousand)

2.

Furthermore Mr Martin has bought and Krupp has sold the
c a r r i e r truck of t h e type
a l s o a s inspected

T a t r a 813 - 8 x 8 .

The p r i c e i s US D o l l a r s 35,000,- ( t h i r t y f i v e thousand)
3.

Furthermore Mr. Martin has bought and Krupp has s o l d the
following d r i l l i n g t o o l s and spare p a r t s :
one
one
one
one
one
one
one
two
two

600
auger
800
auger
500
rock auger
600
bucket
800
bucket
850
core b a r r e l
870
core b a r r e l
880
cutting rings
reamers for
3.600

mm d i a .
mm d i a .
mm d i a .
mm d i a .
mm d i a .
mm d i a .
mm d i a .
mm d i a .
mm d i a .

one pushing (in and out) cylinder
one rotary gear box
four s l i d i n g pads
The p r i c e is US D o l l a r s 7.000,- (seven thousand) / J T S 5 5 I T " - • • •

f) I f,/fr
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Annex 1 to the contract between Mr. Martin and Krupp
Maschinentechnik dated January 10th 1990.
Specimen for the text of a letter of credit.
•

By order and for account of
ve hereby issue our
irrevocable Documentary Credit No
in favour of Krupp
for DM
(fob value) valid until
in West
Germany available at sight as follows:
100% of the fob value amounting to DM
is
payable against presentation of the following
documents:
Commercial invoice signed by Seller in ....copies
Full set of Bill of Lading made out to
freight
prepaid notify address ......
or Forwarders Certificate of Receipt
Insurance Certificate in duplicate
Suppliers declaration
Covering shipment of 1 KDMdrilling machine plus accessories on
fob basis from West Germany to
by ship
Part shipment: allowed
Transshipment: allowed
Please advise beneficiary of the opening of this credit adding
your confirmation.
This credit is subject to the Uniform Customs and Practice for
Documentary Credits (1983 Revision), International Chamber of
Commerce Publication No. 400.

- 2 4.

On all the Items listed above under 1. to 3. any warranty
and any other claims whatsoever are excluded.

5.

The prices have to be understood fob Horthsea port
according to INCOTERMS as per issue 1980.
The items under 3. above shall be packed seaworthy.

6.

The payment will be effected by means of an irrevocable
letter of credit in the favour of Krupp being issued
immediately upon return of Mr Martin to the USA - latest
however until January 25th 1990 - with a validity until
February 28. 1990. Krupp has handed out a specimen text of
a letter of credit as Annex 1. Mr Martin shall, ask his bank
to release the text of the L/C to Krupp by telefax.
The following documents shall be presented for the
remittance of the L/C:
One commercial invoice plus two copies each for the
items or group of items listed under 1. to 3.
Complete set of clean on board ocean bills of lading
consigned to the order of Mr. Martin . Notify
Valsco, Drilling Equipment Supplies,
12929 Telegraph Road
Santa Fe Springs, Calif. 90670
For customs clearance evidencing shipment from West
Germany to Los Angeles/USA.
Bills of lading to be marked "freight collect11.
Suppliers declaration.
Upon presentation of the documents the above amount shall
be payable unconditionally.
Krupp shall paint the KDM anew as soon as the L/C has been
received by Krupp.
colours: carrier truck
black
KDM body
orange
KDM mast
white
Immediately upon finalization of the painting the KDM as
veil as the other items will be shipped to the Northsea
port still to be selected.
Mr Martin shall instruct Krupp as soon as possible about
the details for the ocean shipment to enable both parties
to arrange for a smooth transportation.

/ at

•3
9.

Title and property shall be transferred to Mr Martin for
the above items as soon as the amounts as per 1. to 3. have
been credited to one of Krupp's bank accounts.

.This contract has been duly signed in the presence of two
witnesses in Essen, Germany on the tenth day of January
nineteen hundred and ninety.

for

p Maschinentechnik:

,\t/flucM^r:
<Carl (Pete) Martin>

oene>

<Peter Drescher>

Witnesses:

CS

<Dr. i t e / a l d Zierul>
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SECTION I

INTRODUCTION
On December 6, 1991, a truck-mounted Krupp Drilling Machine (KDM unit) was being
driven to a site near San Simeon, California After the driver failed to negotiate a curve,
the KDM unit rolled over and down a slope.

On November 10,1992, the Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. was retained to determine the
value of the KDM unit at the time of the accident and other information germane to the
accident.

Our report is based on the information available to us at this time, as described in
Section IV, BASIS OF REPORT. Should additional information become available, we
reserve the right to determine the impact, if any, of the new information on our opinions
and conclusions, and to revise our opinions and conclusions if necessary and warranted
by the discovery of additional information.
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SECTION n

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In conducting our investigation, we formed the following opinions:

1.

The KDM unit was a prototype model and foreign made
which greatly diminishes its value when comparing it to a
commercial model of domestic manufacture.

2.

The value of the KDM unit depreciated between the time of
purchase and the time of the accident.

3.

Such depreciation is in the range of 20 to 30 percent. The
residual value at the time of the accident is approximately
$62,250, based on an initial purchase price of $87,000.

4.

The KDM drilling unit was purchased from Krupp at a
significant discount due to the following factors:

a)

It was sold as a one-of-a-kind prototype and
was never put into regular production.

Page 2

b)

It was sold as a demonstrator and was not
considered as a new piece of equipment.

c)

It was assembled to the specifications of an
eastern European government, which diminished
its value to other customers.

d)

The construction, oil, and gas industries (which
were the primary markets for such units in the
United States) were depressed, causing a
surplus of existing equipment and a lack of
demand for new units.

5.

We have seen no evidence that the KDM unit was road
tested for the United States market. Also no evidence has
been provided to confirm that the KDM unit was checked for
U.S. transportation requirements. Such deficiencies could
have contributed to or caused the accident.
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SECTION HI

DISCUSSION
The original purchase price of the KDM unit was $87,000, which included $45,000 for the
drilling assembly, $35,000 for the truck carrier, and $7,000 for spare parts. We normally
consider used equipment sales prices if an orderly market exists. The KDM unit under
investigation is a one-of-a-kind, foreign-made prototype. The only sale price that is
valid is the original sale price. Under these circumstances, figuring depreciation is an
approximation as some components of the KDM unit were as much as seven years old
at the time of the Martin purchase, January 10,1990. Also, some of the parts and the
spare parts are consumable and would have been used up or at least depleted by the
time of the accident on December 6,1991.

From a tax standpoint, domestic units are usually depreciated out over a period of 10 to
15 years. The unit was approaching two years of age since the original Martin purchase.
From a practical standpoint, annual depreciation is figured in the range of 7 to 10 percent
per annum and drive-off depreciation is in the same range. This puts total depreciation
in the range of 20 to 30 percent. For our calculation, we picked a mid-range number of
25 percent depreciation.

During on or around the period from November 28, 1990 to January 7, 1992, certain

Page 4

repairs were made on the KDM unit. The invoice for this work was $12,908.90, of which
$12,420 was for labor. Much of this is described as maintenance, such as repair weld,
adjust brakes, derrick, cable rollers, kelly bar, reweld chain covers, repair filter leaks, tank
leaks, and miscellaneous leaks. At least some of this work appears to be for disassembly
of the chain and sprocket gears, machine modification to change gear ratio, and
reassembly of the unit. Based on this invoice and testimony we have reviewed regarding
this work, we see no reason to believe that it has significantly altered the value of the
KDM unit. Much of the work was normal maintenance and the rest was to reduce
rotational speed.

The KDM drilling unit was a one of a kind prototype that never reached regular
production. This means that it was an experimental and developmental model. With
such a model, there are design and production problems that have to be worked out.
According to Mr. Carl's testimony, Krupp was in this process when they decided to cease
development of the unit. Based on the testimony of Mr. Carl and Mr. Martin, the market
would not bear the price Krupp would need for such a unit. A problem with this prototype
is that it has not gone through the debugging process (where design and production kinks
or problems are worked out) that a regular production model is subjected to. The owner
or operator of such a developmental prototype is likely to experience problems that would
normally be eliminated by the debugging process. The fact that the debugging phase
was not completed greatly diminishes the value to a knowledgeable purchaser. Such a
unit can be a liability at any price. The factors mentioned in conclusion numbers one and
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four are the reasons that the KDM unit sold at the price that it did in 1990 and would also
adversely affect its value at the time of the accident.

According to testimony from Mr. Showalter, the KDM unit was originally built for the
government of Czechoslovakia. Also according to his testimony, the Czechs sent the
truck to Krupp and that is why it is on a Czech truck. Mr. Showalter also mentions
transportation problems once the KDM unit reached California

According to his

testimony the KDM unit was 9,000 to 10,000 pounds overweight based on its length. This
was 10,000 pounds heavier than it was supposed to be, based on the numbers Krupp
supplied with purchase documents. The weight error is unaccounted for but could be a
result of the prototype debugging process.

Pre-production improvement usually

increases weight, and these changes tend to be cumulative. We do not know if the
knowledge of weight problems was passed on to Mr. Cannon (the driver at the time of
the accident or other drivers.

The KDM unit was equipped with a dual pinion drive. In lay terms, this means that power
was supplied to the kelly (a square or angular bar that transmits rotation to the drilling
assembly) from both sides rather than only one side. The primary advantages of the dual
drive are that it is more rugged and is less prone to vibration. This will allow for some
increase in penetration with some soils and conditions. The trade-off is higher cost and
reduced portability due to increased weight.
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We have seen no evidence that the KDM unit was road tested. This could be a problem
knowing that the truck was provided by a foreign country (Czechoslovakia) for a foreign
company (Krupp in West Germany) with the intention that it would be returned to
Czechoslovakia. Based on the problems encountered in California (the initial weight
problems noted by Showalter and the accident), the knowledge that the unit was not
originally intended for the United States market, and the fact that it was a prototype, we
question if it was road tested or checked to see if U.S. transportation requirements were
met. Failure to meet these requirements could have been a factor in the accident.
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SECTION IV

BASIS OF REPORT
In conducting our investigation, we performed the following work and reviewed the
following documentation:

1.

Sales agreements between Carl (Pete) Martin and Krupp
Maschinentechnik GmbH, and Carl D. Martin and Robert D.
Showalter.

2.

Truck documents provided to Lynn Larsen by Bob McRae.
These documents include the following:

a)

Loan description to Martin from Showalter

b)

Sales contract between Martin and Krupp.

c)

Security

agreement

between

Martin

and

Martin

and

Showalter.

d)

VCC-1

financing

statement

Showalter.
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e)

Secured promissory notes Martin and Showalter.

f)

Description, truck carrier, parts, and service
manual.

g)

Krupp invoices on KDM unit, #94131, #94132,
and #94133.

h)

Weight ticket.

i)

Truck permit.

j)

Quote on Kelly crowd.

k)

Packing certificate.

0

Delivery tickets.

m)

Repair invoice.

n)

EPA clean air act notice.
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Conversation with John Cannon.

This was a general

conservation with regard to a description of the KDM unit and
a description of its use leading up to the accident, as noted
in the introduction.

Deposition of Carl D. Martin.

Deposition of Robert D. Showalter.

Deposition of Joseph Carl.

Deposition of Stanley Anderson.
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SECTION IV

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
Several areas noted as follows are to be considered for additional development.

We have seen no evidence that the prototype KDM unit was road tested
for the U.S. market or otherwise designed in accordance with D.O.T.
regulations.

If these tests and requirements were completed, we

recommend that the documentation be made available.'
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A G R E E M E N T

Agreement ric'e t h i s
?1
day of
Feb
1981,
cit
betweencarl n and/or Lori Lynn MSAvn
Vernal
V
o f Vernal
county of Ujntah
s t a t e of n ^
. herein
referred
to
as
debtor,
and
..Rnhprt R. anriior Monta Rae Showaltor
h e r e i n referred
to
as
secured p a r t i e s .
In consideration of the
mutual covenants and promises s e t
f o r t h h e r e i n the debtor and s e c u r e d p a r t y as f o l l o w s :
CREATION OF SECURITY INTEREST
Debtor hereby g r a n t s t o s e c u r e d p a r t y a s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t i n
the
collateral
described
i n s e c t i o n two o f t h i s agreement, t o
secure t h e performance and payment
of
the f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i b e d

note; jj and> j 2
_
_
and all costs end expenses incurred
by secured party in the
collection and enforcement of the note and other indebtedness of
debtor.
DESCRIPTION 0 p COLLATERAL
The collateral of this security agreement, herein
to as ccllstsrel consists of: Drilling Rig

referred

Inventory end accounts receivable wheather now owned or hereafter
ais-'iref.
Inducing all proceeds arising there from wheather in
t K e fcrm of accounts o K other wise both tangible or intangible.
PEPTG**S OELIGATIQV, GENERALLY
<a) Fa/rent. Debtor shall pay to secured party the sum
e-/i csr.ee t,
ths above msr-ticne* note or any renewals of
e::te.nsicns thereof e^.cuted pursuant to this security agreement in
accordarcs with the terrs of such note.
<t) Warranties
covenants that:

and

representations.

Debtor warrants and

1. The e are nc set crfs or counter claims
rr.i'-s ara:r-st the Irventcry or Arcc-jr-tf receivable.
2.

T

hr

i-.srtc-y
.

of any

a-.f. azro.nts receivable are free

. — * — £ ' - . a: r e n t e ^eraivable w i l l
-£••!•€£
zz a n /
fc^ac- other t h a t
f i s - c e r t t : * a z .* a r ; r * - t * .

n o t be
s,ezvred

• - 1 * - * £ • •. c' t cr-fanc1 i n v e n t o r y a n d ,
r\ t u r l£ ^ . : c ! £ l n and der^nds o f £ 11

persens.

FINANCING STATEMENT

At
the
request
of
secured
party,
debtor
will
j o i n in
executing
or
will
execute,
as
appropriate,
all
necessary
f i n a n c i n g s t c t e r c e n t s i n a f o r m s a t i s f a c t o r y t o s e c u r e d p a r t y and
will
psy
the
ccst
of
filing
cush s t a t e m e n t s , i n c l u d i n g a l l
s t a t u t o r y fees.
Debtor
warrants
that
no f i n a n c i n g s t a t e m e n t
covering
the
collateral
or
any
part
t h e r e o f o r any p r o c e e d s
t h e r e o f i s p r e s e n t l y on f i l e i n a n y p u b l i c o f f i c e .
DEFAULT

If debtor frils to pay when due any amount payable on the
above-cautioned note or any other indebtedness of debtor, secured
ty this agreement or fails to observe or perform any of the
previsions of this agreement debtor shall be in default*
REMEDIES
CT: c r v
dsfs-. I t
by
debtor,
end a t
any t i m e t h e r e a f t e r ,
s e c u r e d f s * " t y r.*y d e c l a r e a l l o b l i g a t i o n s s e c u r e d by t h i s
$ S " 5 s - s p t , i r - s d i e t e l y due and p a y a b l e and may p r o c e e d t o e n f o r c e
•:*•, r e n t
c r .d s : : e r c i s e
any
end
a l l o f t h e r i g h t s , and r e m e d i e s
p » - c v : i a d : *. Utsh code A n n .
70(A)-9-101 et
seq. as
w e l l as a l l
e t h s " r i g h t s end r e m e d i e s p r c s s s s s e d t y s e c u r e d p a r t y .
GOVERNING LAW

The
vtlididty
of
this
s e c u r i t y agreerrent and any p o r t i o n
thereof
shsll
be
determined
ur.der
and
shall
be
constured
a c c o r d i n g t e n t h s laws o f t h e S t a t e Of U t a h .

the

!r. K i t n e s i
t h e r e o f t h e p a r t i e s have e x e c u t e d t h i s
tiy
i~*z •/€**• f i * * s t above w r i t t e n .

agreement

Th<t FINANCINO STATEMENT it presented to t filing officer for f i l l / * pur*»M
Commercial Codt.
1. Oebtor(s) (Lest N « i v First) and eddressles)

Car) 0. Martin and, or Lor1
Uynn Martinlnd. and, jointly
2985 W. 1820 So. Vernal, Ut.
soc**istcu'itY<* 443^58,2274

to tht Uniform

2. Secured r V t y ( i t f ) tnd eddress(ea)

Robert D. and/or Monta Rae
Showalter

2700 W< 1500 No.
Vernal, Utah 84078

Emp.Fod.l.O.No.&2a-lUga20
4. This financing statement covers tht following typo* (or iumt) of proptrty:
ib Grots safes prict
of collateral

For Fiing Offiotr ( O t t t , Time. Number.
and Filing Qffiot)

$ 97,000,00
$
or tret tax paid to

T h t Secured party if )(XX * * ° *
• atHtr or
purchase money lendtr of thecollaterei.

t . Assignttts) of Secured Party tnd
Addrtttftt)
Microfilm No.
Thif statement it filed without t N debtor's signature to perfect a security interest in cofttttrti. (Check QQ if so)

B

Suttof

already subject to a security interest in another Jurisdiction when H wet brought Into this state.
which is proceeds of the original collateral described above in which a security inttrtft wet perfected:

Check QiJ) if covtred:

Q

Proceeds of Collateral art also covered.

3. Maturity date (if any):

By

Q

Products of Collateral art tfto covered. No, of additional Sheets presented:
Approved fry Oavtd $. Mortson,
Lt. Governor / Secretary of State, for the Statt of Utah

-zr*&
9^*Uitt(i)>f Oeotor(t)
S*9n/tL!e(i)Nrf

Filing Officer C o p y - Alphobeficol

*V-

STANDARD FORM - FORM UCC-1.

$i«naturt(s) of Secured Party(ies)

§ 67

DAMAGES

for injury to property generally,11 damages are recoverable for
mental distress caused by tortious injury to property, even though
unaccompanied by personal injuries.1*
The proper measure of compensatory damages for wrongful
interference with a business is the diminution of the value of the
business traceable to the wrongful act, as reflected by loss of
profits, expenses incurred, or similar concrete evidence of injury.10
§ 68. Personal property
The proper measure of damages for the complete destruction of
personal property is the reasonable market value of the property
destroyed.*1 Neither the cost of the property* nor the expense of
replacing it*3 is the proper measure. Where the property has not
^een wholly destroyed, the proper measure of damages for its
partial destruction is the difference between its market value
immediately before and immediately after the injury;14 but if it can
18. Sec §§ 68 ct scq., infra.
19. § 73, infra.
20. Diodes, Inc. v Franzen, 260
CA2d 244, 67 Cal Rptr 19.
For general discussion of damages
for lost profits from injury to business,
see § 81, infra.
21. Sickles v Mt. Whitney Power A
Electric Co,, 177 C 278, 170 P 599;
Tatone v Chin Bing, 12 CA2d 543, 55
P2d 933; Griffith v Bucknarn, 81
CA2d454, 184 P2d 179.
Damages for the destruction of a
newspaper subscription book must, unless special damage is alleged, be limited to the value of the book. Nunan v
San Francisco, 38 C 689.
As to how market value is ascertained, see § 49, supra.
Annotations: Measure of damages
for destruction of or damage to automobile other than commercial vehicle,
32 ALR 711, s 78 ALR 917, 169 ALR
1100; Measure of damages for loss of

126

or injury to wearing apparel or household goods, 63 ALR 240; Measure of
damages for destruction of or injury to
commercial vehicle, 169 ALR 1074;
Damages recoverable from warehouseman for negligence causing injury to,
or destruction of, goods of a perishable
nature. 32 ALR2d 910; Measure of
damages for destruction of or injury to
airplane, 73 ALR2d 719.
Practice References: 3 Am Jur
Proof of Facts 491, Damages, Proofs
4-6 (proofs of damages for injury to or
destruction of personal property).
22. Nunan v San Francisco, 38 C
689.
23. Merrill v PaciSc Transfer Co.,
131 C 582, 63 P 915.
24. Kincaid v Dunn, 26 CA 686,
148 P 235; Rhodes v Firestone Tire A
Rubber Co., 51 CA 569, 197 P 392;
Menefee v Raisch Improv. Co., 78 CA
785, 248 P 1031; Byrne v Western
Pipe A Steel Co., 81 CA 270, 253 P

23 Cal Jur 3d

TATONE v. CHIN BING

Cal.
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TATONE v. CHIN B1NG et al.
Civ. 1315.

pistrict Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
California.
March 19, 1936.
1. Damages <£=>I05

Proper measure of damages for destruction of personalty is reasonable market value of property destroyed,
2. Damages <§=»I74(I)

In action for destruction of truckload of
produce, evidence of price paid for produce
at wholesale market on day of its destruction held admissible on question of damages.
3. Damages @=>I39

Evidence that truckload of produce had
been purchased for $150 at wholesale market
shortly before its destruction held to support
judgment for $150 for its loss.'

Appeal from Superior Court,
County; Arthur Allyn, Judge.

Fresno

to the cost of the fruit and vegetables.
Defendants maintain that their objections
to this evidence should have been sustained and that there is no proper evidence in
the record as to the plaintiff's damage
caused by the destruction of the personal
property in question here.
[1] There can be no question but that
the proper measure of damage in a case of
this kind is the reasonable market value
of the personal property destroyed. Murray
v. Southern Pacific Company, 112 Cal.App.
150, 296 P. 667. In an action for breach
of contract to deliver personal property, it
has been held that evidence of the price
paid in the open market for like property
to supply deficiencies in the delivery was
not material to plaintiff's case in proving
damage. Fairchild, etc., Co. v. Southern
Refining Co., 158 Cal. 264, 110 P. 951.
See, also, Mattern v. Alderson, 18 CaLApp.
590, 123 P. 972. In Sanders v. Austin, 180
Cal. 664, 182 P. 449, it was held that, while
the evidence of the cost price of an automobile in use by the owner for several
months may not be admissible, still if such
evidence be admitted without objection it
furnished some evidence of value.

Action by Frank Tatone against Chin
The case of Angell v. Hopkins,' 79 Cal.
Bing and another. Judgment for plaintiff, 181, 21 P. 729, 730, was an action for the
and defendants appeal.
recovery of personal property, or its value,
Affirmed.
in case delivery could not be had. The
Wakefield & Hansen, of Fresno, for ap- court there said: "It is contended that
there was error in admitting evidence as
pellants.
to what the property cost the plaintiff. It
Lucius Powers, Jr., and Barbour, Kellas is quite true that the measure of damages
& Backlund, all of Fresno, for respondent is the value of the property at the time of
the conversion, with certain additions in
MARKS, Justice,
certain cases. Civil Code, § 3336. But in
This is an appeal from a judgment arriving at such value it was proper to
awarding plaintiff damages for injury to take into consideration what the property
personal property. An automobile of de- cost as a circumstance to aid at arriving
fendant Bing struck a truck of plaintiff at its value at the time in question. Luse
loaded with fruit and vegetables which were v. Jones, 39 NJ.Law [707] 708; Jones v.
destroyed in the accident. The trial court Morgan, 90 N.Y. [4] 10 [43 Am.Rep. 131];
allowed pfaintiff damages in the sum of Norton v. Willis, 73 Me. 580; Small v.
$150 for the loss of the fruit and vegeta- Pool, 8 Ired. [30 N.C.] 47; Boggan v.
bles. The correctness of the award of this Home, 97 N.C. 268, 2 S.E. 224; Rawson
item of damage is the sole question pre- v. Prior, 57 Vt. [612] 615; Ford v. Smith,
27 Wis. [261] 267; Roberts v. Dunn, 71
sented on this appeal.
111. [46] 50." See, also, Greenebaum v.
The agent of plaintiff had purchased the
Taylor, 102 Cal. 624, 36 P. 957.
fruit and vegetables at a cost of $150, at a
wholesale market in Fresno early on the
It has also been held that the price at
morning of the accident. He was proceed- which a thing can be sold at public sale, or
ing to his markets in the west part of Fres- in the open market, is some evidence of its
no county when the accident occurred. market value. Yukon, etc., Co. v. Gratto,
Over the objection of defendants, plaintiff 136 Cal. 538, 69 P. 252; Meyer v. McAland his agents were permitted to testify as lister, 24 Cal.App. 16, 140 P. 42; Moore
^=>For other cases see came topic and KEY NUMBER in all Key Number Digests and Indexei
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notice of lack of certificate held not to prohibit nonresident architect who gave such notice from supervising construction of building, since statutory term "practice of architecture" is synonymous with "furnishing
plans or other data for buildings" (St.1901, p.
644, § 5).
"Architect" is one who makes plans
and specifications for a building, and superintends its construction.
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions of
"Architect"
and "Practice of ArchitecIn Quint v. Dimond, 147 Cal. 707, 82 P .
ture," see Words & Phrases.]
310, it was held competent to prove market value in the nearest market
v. Maryland Casualty Co., 100 Cal.App.
658, 280 P. 1008.
In San Diego Water Co. v. San Diego,
118 Cal. 556, at page 568, 50 P. 633, 38 L.R.
A. 460, 62 Am.St.Rep. 261, the rule is announced that the judicial test of market
value depends upon the fact that the property in question is marketable at a given
price, which in turn depends upon the fact
that sales of similar property have been,
and are being, made at ascertainable prices.

[2,3] In the instant case the fruit and
vegetables were purchased in the public
wholesale market nearest the place of destruction a short time before the accident
The price paid was the wholesale price of
the articles asked in this market No contrary evidence was introduced by defendants. Under these circumstances, the evidence bore upon the reasonable market value of the fruit and vegetables, and sustains the judgment
Judgment affirmed.
We concur:
KINGS, J.

BARNARD, P. J.;

Appeal from Superior Court, Los Angeles County; Robert W. Kenny, Judge.
Action by J. Harold MacDowell against
the City of Long Beach, wherein defendant
filed a cross-complaint
Judgment for
plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Affirmed.

Nowland M. Reid, City Atty., and Edmund J. Callaway, Deputy City Atty., both
of Long Beach, for appellant.
Ivan L. Hiler, Herman Tepp, and Jay
J E N - J. Stein, all of Hollywood, for respondent.
SHINN, Justice pro tern.
Appeal by defendant from a judgment in
favor of plaintiff, in an action to recover
fees for architectural services.

MacDOWELL v. CITY OF LONG BEACH.
Civ. 9685.
District Court of Appeal, Second District,
Division 1, California.
March 24, 1936.
Hearing Denied by Supreme Court
May 21, 1936.

Plaintiff, a nonresident architect, was
employed by the city of Long Beach, under
written contract, to prepare plans and specifications for, and to supervise the construction of, a municipal auditorium. His compensation was fixed at $84,000, of which
$12,932,34 sued for herein, remains unpaid.
The city, by answer and cross-complaint,
alleged negligence in the preparation of the
plans and specifications, and sought recovery of $30,621.27, as damages. • Plaintiff's
claim was allowed; the city was awarded
an offset of $7,832.50 as damages, and
plaintiff was given judgment for the difference in the sum of $5,108.77.

1. Licenses <§=>39
Statute providing that any person might
furnish building plans for others after informing them that he was not a certified
architect held to authorize nonresident architect, who had informed his employer that he
Plaintiff held no certificate from the state
held no architect's certificate, to prepare
board of architectural examiners.
The
plans and data for building to be erected in
court found that some two weeks prior to
state (SL1901, p. 644, § 5).
the date of the contract, plaintiff informed
the city manager of defendant that he held
2. Licenses <§=>39
no
such certificate.
Statute prohibiting practice of architecture without a certificate but permitting any
person to furnish building plans who gave

The statute regulating the practice of architecture, at the time of the contract

C^For other cases see same topic and KEY NUMBER in all Key Number Digests and Indexes
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S€C7ldN24 ATTORNEYS FEES

In the event the parte* become Involved »n MigaUon or arbftf atfon with each other arising out of this Aprasmont or other
performance thareof m *hich the services of an attorney or other expert are reasonably required the pre^aflmgf party theJj b#
fully compensated for the cost o* its pari opatfon In svch proceedings inducing fhe cost Incurred foe attomeye' fee* and
•xperta* faas Unless judgment £o«* by default, the atlomeyt' fee award ahaK not be eon pi/lad in accordance wfifTarty oou4
schedule but shaU be such as to fufy reimburse ail attorneys faas actually incurrad In pood faith, reoardtess of the »xe of a
Juo^ment,ftbeing the intention o' fha pa lies to fufty compensate for ail attorneys* teas and experts' fee* paid or Incurred fit
good faith,
SECTION
25.acreemenis)
LABOR AGREEMENTS (List labor aareementstowhich Contractortesignatory or enter NONE V Confrador
ties
no labor

S t a t e o f C a l i f o r n i a C a r p e n t e r s , Cement Masons, L a b o r e r s .
O p e r a t i n g E n g i n e e r s and Tearrstere

SECTION 25. SPECIAL PROVISIONS (Including unit pricing If applicable)
Subcontractor w i l l f u r n i s h and i n s t a l l t h e f o l l o w i n g

iteae;

Itea
1W
#15

Description
Quantity
Uhit Price
Agpimt
Brill 29»+ Shaft and Set Beams
1 3 ^ 0 1^ # i ^ ^
AA?***"T
Mobilization for BriLUng
Luep Sua f f 3^000.00
^
>
Total: •*
I^L-SMBSB^
Exhibit *A» ia attached to cad aade a part of t h i s subcontract^-—
* -*- * - ,
CONTRACTORS ARE REOUIRED BV LAW TO BE LICENSED AnJO REGUUTSD BV TH£ CONTRACTORS STATE
LICENSE BOARD ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING A CONTRACTOR MAY BE REFERRED TO THE REQISTOAROf*
K
THE BOARD, WHOSE ADDRESS IS
% *£*
Contractor* State License Board
Post Office Box 26000
Sacramento Catfcmla 9582$
Dated:

\\

3 * * 31

feted: December 2, 1991

OOaTTHACrofl: Coast Geo-Constructors, Inc.
SUBCQWHACTOR:

Rocky Mountain D r i i l i n g
%fo^^Towner)

150 Executive Pari' Blvd., Su*tc 3600

2700 West 1500 North

Sar *—anexsoo, Ci cin^l

Vernal. Utah 84078

(Address)

(Address)

440566 A, B, C-57 4 C-61
(Contractor's License No.)
( Contractor '5 License No.)

•13-
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§ 7028

7 0 2 8 ^ ) Contracting without license; second and subsequent
offensesT It is a misdemeanor for any person to engage in the business or act in the capacity of a contractor within this state without
having a license therefor, unless such person is particularly exempted from the provisions of this chapter. If such a person has
been previously convicted of the offense described in this section, the
court shall impose a fine of not less than one hundred dollars ($100)
nor more than two thousand dollars ($2,000), or imprisonment in
the county jail for not less than 10 days nor more than six months,
or both.
(Added by Stats.1939, c. 37, p. 384, § 1. Amended by Stats.1963, c. 1883,
p. 3867, § 1; Stats.1969, c. 1583, p. 3218, § 4; Stats.1972, c. 125, p. 166,

ID
Historical Note

As added in 1939, this section read:
The declaration making a violation of
"It is unlawful for any person to en- this section a misdemeanor formerly apgage in the business or act in the capacity peared in section 7030.
of a contractor within this State without
The 1969 amendment, in the first senhaving a license therefor, unless such
person is particularly exempted from the tence, substituted "It is a misdemeanor"
for "It is unlawful", it deleted the former
provisions of this chapter."
second sentence which had been added in
The 1963 amendment added two sen- 1963, and it increased the fine to $2,000.
tences which provided: "Any violation of
The 1972 amendment provided for a
this section is a misdemeanor. If such a
person has been previously convicted of minimum fine or minimum imprisonment.
the offense described in this section, the
Derivation: Stats.1929, c. 791, p. 1591,
court shall impose a fine of not more f 1; Stats.1933. c 573, p. 1483, | 1;
than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or Stats.1935, c 816, p. 2215,11.
imprisonment in the county jail for not
more than six months, or both."
Cross References

Conspiracy by licensee as a misdemeanor, see | 125.
"Contractor" defined, see § 7026.
"Person" defined, see | 7025.
Persons exempt, see § 7040 et seq.
Punishment for misdemeanor where not otherwise prescribed, see Penal Code } 19.
Violation of section as disqualification from taking contractor's examination, see i
7065.1.
Law Review
Insolvency as grounds for disciplining
a licensed contractor (1964) 15 HastXJ.
348.
Licenses, effect of failure to comply
with a licensing statute upon the right to
recover for work done that should have
been done only with a license. (1949) 23
So.CaXL.R. 98.
Minimum penalty for unlicensed contractor. (1973) 4 Pacific L.J. 255.

Commentaries
Penalties for violation of administrative
rule. (1953) 41 C.L.R. 341, 344.
Pre-emption of municipal licensing by
state Contractors' License Act (1959) 47
C.L.R. 607.
Right of unlicensed subcontractor performing services for general contractor to
recover against contractor for services.
(1958) 10 HastLJ. 89.

Library References

CJ.S. Licenses f § 66, 67, 78.

Licenses <£=>40.

203

n~~> *-^>

§ 7027.3

BUSINESS AKD PROFESSIONS

a

Some provision* in this section wers contained in
former } 7026.11, added by Stata.1984, c 816, | 2.

Library References
Licenses •»U®.
C JS. licenses f 30,
} 7027.5, Landscape contractor; design authority
A landscape contractor working within the classification for which the Beense isfesxiedmay de
systems or facilities for work to be performed and supervised by that contractor.
(Added by Stats4988, c 699, f 12.)
9 7 0 ^ ^ Contracting without license; second and subsequent offenses; limitation of act!
(a) It is a misdemeanor for any person to engage In the business or act in the capacity (
contractor within this state without having a license therefor, unless such person is Darticul
exempted from the provisions of this chapter.
(b) If such a person has been previously convicted of the offense described in this section,
court shall impose a fine of * * * 30 percent of the price of the contract onder which the unhcen
person performed contracting work, or four thousand five hundred dollars ($4.500), whicheyei
greater, or imprisonment in the county jail for not less than 10 days nor more tnan six montfij
(c) In the event the person perfonning the contracting work has agreed to furnish materials i
lflbor on an hourly basis, "the price of the contract" for the purposes of this section means
aggregate sum of the cost of materials and labor furnished and the cost of completing the work to
performed.
{d} Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, an indictment for any violation
this section with respect to work done by the unlicensed contractor shall be found or an informat
or complaint filed within three years from the date of completion of the work.
(Amended by Stats.1982, c $07, p. 2589, } 1; Stats.1989, c 366, { 1.)
Historical and Statutory Notes
1*82 Amendment Added subd (d).
1*8$ Leciilattos
The 1989 amendment, m subd <bX aabsb'tuted "20
percent of the price of the contract under which the
unlicensed person performed contracting work, or four

thousand five hundred dollars (R500), whichever
greater** for "not less than one hundred dollar* ($1
" * " ? ! * **? ^ ° ****?*** ^ ^ W W ' . *
« b d (c) defining the price of the contract"; and mi
nonsubstantive changes throughout

Notes of Decisions
Borden of prooi tLS

by statute" and hordes of proof m contractor Sees
cases it otherwise so prorided. FEEroore r. Irvine (Aj
3 Dist.1983) 194 Calipfcr. S19, 146 CJUd 649.

6. Additional pesaKkt
By enacting | 7031, the legislature manifested
to
determination that the misdemeanor penalties otherwise
provided for contracting without a beenae constitute
insufficient deterrent to prevent the conduct prohibited
Brown v. Solano County Businesa Development, Inc.
(1979) 154 CaLRptr. 700, 92 OA^d 192.
H*. Burden of proof

21 Sentence and punishment
Offense of engaging is business or acting in eapaci
0 f contractor without being licensed is not a vktimle
crime as a matter of law for purposes of orderb
restitution and issue whether crime has a "victim"
question of fact to be determined through evaluation 1
t ^ ^nit o f mdividuahied facts of case. People
Hays {Super. 1991) 286 Cal.Rptr. 462, 2S4 CalApp^d 2

Notwithstanding EvidC. § 500 provision that one
claiming that another is guilty of wrongdoing has bur*
den of proof on the issue and that contracting without a
license is a misdemeanor (this section), defendant owners, in action by unlicensed dry-wall finisher to toreclose mechanics' Ken, did not have burden of proving
that the finisher was an unlicensed contractor and,
under § 7031, barred from maintaining the action as
EvidC. § 520 is inapplicable when "otherwise provided

hi prosecution arising out of guilty plea to charge <
engaging in business or acting in capacity of contract
without being licensed based on defendant's entry ini
landscaping contract, trial court had to ascertain wbet
er contract was in any way induced by other party
assumption that defendant held a contractor's licens
if so, then other party was a •Victim'* and restitotx
hearing would have to be held People v. Hays (Si
per. 1991) 286 CaLRptr. 462, 234 Cal.App.3d 22.

Additions or changes Indicated by undertlnsi deletion* by asterisks •
54
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§

7031

and calls for bid; and (c) all forms of advertising, as prescribed by
the registrar of contractors, used by such a person.
(Added by Stats.1972, c. 124, p. 165, § 1, operative July 1, 1973. Amended by Stats.1973, c. 153, p. 452, § 1, eff. July 6, 1973, operative July 1,
1973.)
Historical Nott
The 1973 amendment inserted the lettered clause designations, substituted
"prescribed by the registrar of contractors'* for "a contractor" and deleted
a sentence which had provided: "As used
in this section, 'advertising' has the meaning given it in Section 702*7."

Section 2 of Stats.1972, c. 124, p. 165,
provided:
"Section 1 of this act shall become operative on July 1, 1973."
o^«4-t^« o n* c?*«+„ <t<m ^ <r 9 . ^ r «
3
° f S t a t s 1 9 ^ * 153 > P- « *
D r S £
^
^
^ ^
^
8haU
operative
July 1,1973."

Licenses £»25.

Library References
C J.S. licenses $ 35.

§ 7031.
Actions by contractor, alleging and proving license. No
person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a contractor, may bring or maintain any action in any court of this state
for the collection of compensation for the performance of any act
or contract for which a license is required by this chapter without
alleging and proving that he was a duly licensed contractor at all
times during the performance of such act or contract, except that
such prohibition shall not apply to contractors who are each individually licensed under this chapter but who fail to comply with
Section 7029.
(Added by Stats.1939, c. 37, p. 384, § 1. Amended by Stats.1957, c. 845,
p. 2067, § 1; Stats.1961, c. 1325, p. 3105, § 1; Stats.1965, c. 681, p. 2059,
§1.)
Historical Note
The 1957 amendment added a paragraph
In 1961, the exception was added to the
which read:
first paragraph.
"Until the expiration of six months
«,. 1 Q A - „^^A~A~4.
i , * J ^
from the date of a suspension of a license
™ e 1965 amendment dented the partpursuant to Section 7068, the provisions g r a p h w h l c h h a d b e e n a d d e d Itt 1 9 5 7 of this section do not apply to any person
Derivation: Stats.1929, c. 791, p. 1595,
whose license was suspended pursuant to § 12; Stats.1931, c 578, p. 1262, | 12;
Section 7068 for failure to notify the
Stats.1933. c. 573, p. 1492, | 13.
registrar within the 10-day period, if such
failure was due to inadvertence."
Form*
See West's California Code Forms, Business and Professions.
Cross References
"Contractor" defined, see § 7026.
"Person" defined, see $ 7025.

217

$ 7030.5

BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS COD]

| 7030,5, Inclusion of license number in documents; advertisinf
Code of Regulations References
License number required in advertising, see 16 Osi
Coda of Regs. 861.
J 7030.6. Renumbered } 7099.11 and amended by Staia.1991, e. 1160 (A.B.2190), f 22
} 7031. Actions by contractor; alleging: and prorinf license; enforcement of security intere*
proof of licensure; substantial compliance
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (d), no person engaged in the business or acting in ti
capacity of a contractor, may bring or maintain any action, or recover in law or equity in any actioi
in any court of this state for the collection of compensation for the performance of any act c
contract for Which a license Is required by this chapter without alleging * • * that he or she was
duly licensed contractor at all tames during the performance of that act or contract, regardless of tr
merits of the cause of action brought by the person, except that this prohibition shall not apply 1
contractors who are each individually licensed under this chapter but who faO to comply with Sectk
7029.
(b) A security interest taken to secure any payment for the performance of any act or contract f<
which a license is required by this chapter is unenforceable if the person performing the act <
contract was not a duly licensed contractor at aQ times during the performance of the act or contra
(c) * * • If licensure or proper licensure is controverted, then proof of licensure pursuant to th
section shall be made by production of a verified certificate of licensure from the Contractors' Sta
License Board which establishes that the individual or entity bringing the action was duly licensed
the proper classification of contractors at all tiroes during the performance of any act or contra
covered by the action.
(d) The judicial doctrine of substantia] compliance shall not apply to this section, except that
court may determine that there has been substantia] compliance with licensure requirements, i
purposes of this section, if it is shown at an evidentiary hearing that the person was a duly been*
contractor during any portion of the 90 days immediately preceding the performance of the act
contract for which compensation is sought, that the persons'* category of licensure would ha
authorized the performance of that act or contract, and that noncompliance with the bcensu
requirement was the result of (1) inadvertent clerical error, or (2) other error or delay not caused
the negligence of the person. Subdivision (b) of Section 143 does not apply to contractors subject
this subdivision.
(e) The exceptions to the prohibition against the application of the judicial doctrine of substant
compliance found in subdivision (d) shall have no retroactive effect These exceptions to ti
prohibition shall only apply to an action or arbitration proceeding, at law or in equity, that
commenced after the effective date of this section.
(Amended by Stats. 1989, c 868, § 1; Stata.1991, c 632 (A.B.1S82), § 1; Stats. 1992, c 229 (AJB.241
• U
Historical and Statutory Notes
lf8f Legislation
- €„^
,
**.._*.
The 1989 amendment rewrote the section.

prorisio&t foBowing "this section" n the first senta
*od added the second sentence; and added subd.
1992 Inflation
The 1992 amendment deleted "and proving^ foOo*
"without alleging" in subd (a); inserted "If licensun
IksnsuVeis controverted, then" at the begini
0 f guD<£ ^

1991 Legislation
*. ,,«*,
j
. j *» . . .
.
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Hie 1991 amendment inserted the mtroductory e*ceptjon m subd. (a); m subd. (d), added the exception
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§ 11120

CJ.S. Labor Relations § 1002 et scq.

§ 1018.

Unauthorized wearing of union button; misdemeanor; punishment
Any person who willfully wears the button of any labor union of this state,
unless entitled to wear the button under the rules of such union, is guilty of a
misdemeanor, and is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for not
more than 20 days or by a fine of not more than forty dollars ($40), or by
both fine and imprisonment.
(Added by Stats.1953, c. 85, p. 807, § 1. Amended by Stats.1983, c. 1092, § 202, eff.
Sept 27, 1983, operative Jan. 1, 1984.)
Historical Note
The 1983 amendment increased the maximum fine from $20 to $40; and made nonsubstantive changes.

Derivation: Stats.1909, a 331, p. 546, § 1.

Cross References
Misdemeanor defined, see Penal Code § 17.

Chapter 3.5
CONTRACTORS
Section
1020. Legislative intent.
1021. Employment by unlicensed contractor, civil penalty for employer.
1021.5. Contract by licensed contractor with contractor or other who is not valid
independent contractor; civil penalty for licensed contractor.
1022. Citation for violations; service; contents.
1023. Content of citation or civil penalty; notice; hearing; final order, payment of
penalty; judgment; interest on judgment
1024. Industrial relations construction industry' enforcement fund; deposit of civil
penalties; use of funds.
Chapter 3.5 was added by Stats. 1979, c. 864, p. 3012, § 1.
§ 1020. Legislative Intent
It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this chapter to establish a
citation system for the imposition of prompt and effective civil sanctions
against violators of the laws and regulations of this state relating to the
employment of workers by unlicensed contractors and the utilization of
unlicensed contractors and other persons who are not valid independent
contractors by licensed contractors.
(Added by Stats.1979, c. 864, p. 3012, § 1. Amended by Stats.1982, c. 761, p. 3008,
§ 1.)
Historical Note
The 1982 amendment added language relating to utilization of unlicensed contractors and

invalid independent contractors by licensed
contractors.
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§ 1021

PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
Div. 2
§ 1021. Employment by unlicensed contractor; civil penalty for employer
Any person who does not hold a valid state contractor's license issued
pursuant to Chapter 9 (commencing with Section 7000) of Division 3 of the
Business and Professions Code, and who employs any worker to perform
services for which such a license is required, shall be subject to a civil penalty
in the amount of one hundred dollars ($100) per employee for each day of
such employment. The civil penalties provided for by this section are in
addition to any other penalty provided by law.
(Added by Stats.1979, c 864, p. 3012, § 1.)
Cross References
Failure of employer to report all payroll of employees, request for payroll audit, see § 90.7.
Library References
Licenses ^^41.
WESTLAW Topic No. 238.
CJS. Licenses §§ 78 to 81.

§ 1021.5. Contract by licensed contractor with contractor or other who
Is not valid independent contractor; civil penalty for licensed contractor
Any person who holds a valid state contractor's license issued pursuant to
Chapter 9 (commencing with Section 7000) of Division 3 of the Business and
Professions Code, and who willingly and knowingly enters into a contract
with any person to perform services for which such a license is required as an
independent contractor, and that person does not meet the burden of proof of
independent contractor status pursuant to Section 2750.5 or hold a valid state
contractor's license, shall be subject to a civil penalty in the amount of one
hundred dollars ($100) per person so contracted with for each day of the
contract. The civil penalties provided for by this section are in addition to
any other penalty provided by law.
(Added by Stats.1982, c 761, p. 3008, § 2.)
Cross References
Failure of employer to report all payroll of employees, request for payroll audit, see § 90.7.
library References
Licenses *=»41.
WESTLAW Topic No. 238.
CJS. Licenses §§ 78 to 8L

§ 1022. Citation for violations; service; contents
If upon inspection or investigation the Labor Commissioner determines
that any person is employing workers in violation of Section 1021 or 1021.5,
he or she may issue a citation to the person in violation. The citation may be
served personally or by registered mail in accordance with subdivision (c) of
Section 11505 of the Government Code. Each citation shall be in writing and
256
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Ft 1

shall describe the nature of the violation, including reference to the statutory
provision alleged to have been violated.
(Added by Stats.1979, c. 864, p. 3012, § 1. Amended by Stats.1982, c. 761, p. 3009,
§3.)
Historical Note
The 1982 amendment inserted "or 1021.5" in
the first sentence and made gender related
change.

§ 1023. Content of citation or civil penalty; notice; hearing; final order;
payment of penalty; judgment; Interest on judgment
(a) If a person desires to contest a citation or the proposed assessment of a
civil penalty therefor, he or she shall within 15 business days after service of
the citation notify the office of the Labor Commissioner which appears on the
citation of his or her request for an informal hearing. The Labor Commissioner or his or her deputy or agent shall, within 30 days, hold a hearing at
the conclusion of which the citation or proposed assessment of a civil penalty
shall be affirmed, modified, or dismissed. The decision of the Labor Commissioner shall consist of a notice of findings, findings, and order which shall
be served on all parties to the hearing within 15 days after the hearing by
regular first-class mail at the last known address of the party on file with the
Labor Commissioner. Service shall be completed pursuant to Section 1013 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. Any amount found due by the Labor Commissioner as a result of a hearing shall become due and payable 45 days after
notice of the findings and written findings and order have been mailed to the
party assessed. A writ of mandate may be taken from that finding to the
appropriate superior court, as long as the party agrees to pay any judgment
and costs ultimately rendered by the court against the party for the assessment. The writ shall be taken within 45 days of service of the notice of
findings, findings, and order thereon.
(b) A person to whom a citation has been issued, shall, in lieu of contesting
a citation pursuant to this section, transmit to the office of the Labor
Commissioner designated on the citation the amount specified for the violation within 15 business days after issuance of the citation.
(c) When no petition objecting to a citation or the proposed assessment of a
civil penalty is filed, a certified copy of the citation or proposed civil penalty
may be filed by the Labor Commissioner in the office of the clerk of the
superior court in any county in which the person assessed has property or in
which the person assessed has or had a place of business. The clerk,
immediately upon the filing, shall enter judgment for the state against the
person assessed in the amount shown on the citation or proposed assessment
of a civil penalty.
(d) When findings and the order thereon are made affirming or modifying
a citation or proposed assessment of a civil penalty after hearing, a certified
copy of the findings and the order entered thereon may be entered by the
Labor Commissioner in the office of the clerk of the superior court in any
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PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
DIv. 2

county in which the person assessed has property or in which the person
assessed has or had a place of business. The clerk, immediately upon the
filing, shall enter judgment for the state against the person assessed in the
amount shown on the certified order.
(e) A judgment entered pursuant to this section shall bear the same rate of
interest and shall have the same effect as other judgments and be given the
same preference allowed by law on other judgments rendered for claims for
taxes. The clerk shall make no charge for the service provided by this section
to be performed by him or her.
(Added by Stats. 1979, c. 864, p. 3012, § 1. Amended by Stats. 1988, c. 96, § 5.)
Historical Note
The 1988 amendment, in subd. (a), substituted "15 business days" for "10 business days'*;
substituted "30 days" for "20 dayr/*; and deleted the third and fourth sentences which read:
"If the person receiving the citation does not
request a hearing with the Labor Commissioner within the prescribed time, the proposed
civil penalty shall be deemed a final order of
the Labor Commissioner and shall not be subject to further administrative review. The Labor Commissioner's determination after the
conclusion of the hearing shall be deemed the
final order of the director and shall not be
subject to further administrative review."

In addition, the 1988 amendment, in subd.
(a) inserted the third to sixth sentences relating
to findings, orders, and writ of mandate; in
subd. (b) substituted "15 business days" for "10
business days"; and substituted subds. (c) to
<e) f o r former subd. (c) which read:
'The Labor Commissioner shall promptly
take all appropriate action to enforce the citation and recover the civil penalty prescribed
thereon or found to be due after a hearing.
The Labor Commissioner may maintain an action in any court of competent jurisdiction to
recover the amount of civil penalties found to
be due,"

Cross References
Employment of minors, contesting citation, procedure, see § 1289.

§ 1024. Industrial relations construction Industry enforcement fund; deposit of civil penalties; use of funds
All civil penalties collected pursuant to this chapter shall be deposited in the
Industrial Relations Construction Industry Enforcement Fund, which is hereby created. All moneys in the fund shall be used for the purpose of enforcing
Section 226.2 ! and the provisions of this chapter, as appropriated by the
Legislature.
It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this section to provide for the
prompt and effective enforcement of labor laws relating to the construction
industry.
(Added by Stats.1981, c. 1172, p. 4719, § 1.)
1

Repealed.
Library References

Licenses *=»41.
WESTLAW Topic No. 238.
CJS. Licenses §§ 78 to 81.
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An allowance of damages in a fixed sum for a loss of profits
from the breach of a contract respecting the sale of a business
does not constitute compensation for a loss of speculative profits,
where the evidence reveals that the business, in the year following
the defendant's breach, netted profits that actually exceeded the
sum granted to the plaintiff for their loss."
§ 81. Injury to business

i

| In allowing damages for loss of profits due to an injury to a
business, either by breach of a contract or commission of a tort,
the law makes a distinction^
nesses, in keeping;\mi^li^generawaii
in

order to be recoverable, must be reasonably certain and not
speculative or remote.64 Thus, a loss of profits occasioned to an
established business as the result of a breach of contract may,
where the loss is neither a remote nor a conjectural consequence
of the breach, constitute the basis for an award of compensatory
damages." Similarly, damages for a loss of prospective profits due
to a tortious interference with the operation of a business may be
recovered if the business in question is an established one, and if
the
plaintiffs
proximately
stemmed
the wrongful
317 P2d
182, certloss
den has
356 US
937, 2
53.
London from
v Zachary,
92 CA2d
L Ed 2d 814, 78 S a 781. De Flavio v
Estell, 173 CA2d 226, 343 P2d 150.

In a subcontractor's action against
the prime contractor for breach of an
electric transmission line construction
subcontract, through cancellation of
the work required by the contract to
be done in a certain area, the fact that
the subcontractor may have been losing money in the area in which he was
permitted to, and did, perform, did not
establish failure of proof of damage,
where the evidence indicated that
plaintiff would have recouped his
losses by performance of the cancelled
work in the withdrawn area. Boomer v
Abbett, 154 CA2d 218, 315 P2d 924.

23 Cal Jur 3d

654, 207 P2d 1067.
In an action for breach of contract
to sell a bar business, an award of
$2,500 was not speculative or disproportionate where there was evidence
that the business defendant refused to
sell produced net income of $3,247.55
in one year and $2,712.56 for the first
eight months of the following year.
Ribiero v Dotson, 187 CA2d 819, 9
CalRptr909.
54. See § 80, supra.
55. Brunvold v Johnson, 36 CA2d
226, 97 P2d 489; Hoag v Jenan, 86
CA2d556t
195P2d451.
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DAMAGES

interference.1* When the operation of an established business is
prevented or interrupted, either by a tort or a breach of contract,
damages for loss of prospective profits that might otherwise have
been earned from operation of the business are ordinarily recoverable since their occurrence and extent may be ascertained with
reasonable certainty from the working experience of the business,
from the past volume of business, and other provable data
relevant to the probable future sales of the business.17

I

A loss of prospective profits from an unestablished business,
either from a breach of contract" or from the commission of a
56. Stoddard v Treadwell, 26 C 294; 864, 229 P2d 348, 28 ALR2d 580;
Dwyer v Carroll, 86 C 298, 24 P 1015; Mann v Jackson, 141 CAJd 6, 296
Hawthorne v Siegcl, 88 C 159, 25 P P2d 120; Gainer v Storck, 169 CAJd
1114; Pacific Steam Whaling Co. v 681, 338 P2d 195; Fibreboard Paper
Alaska Packers9 Assn., 138 C 632, 72 Products Corp. v East Bay Union of
P 161; Barnes v Berendes, 139 C 32, Machinists, 227 CA2d 675, 39 Cal
69 P 491, 72 P 406; Western Union Rptr 64; Drouet v Moulton, 245 CA2d
Tel. Co. v Commercial Pac. Cable Co., 667, 54 Cal Rptr 278
177 C 577, 171 P 317; Steiner v Long
Beach Local No. 128, 19 C2d 676, 123 In proving loss of profits from an
P2d 20; Natural Soda Products Co. v established business in a leased store,
Los Angeles, 23 C2d 193, 143 P2d 12, the trial court did not err in admitting
cert den 321 US 793, 88 L Ed 1082, evidence relating to income from other
64 S a 790, reh den 322 US 768, 88 stores owned and operated by plaintiff,
L Ed 1594, 64 S a 942; Smith v and shown to have been operated unShasta Electric Co., 190 CA2d 728, 12 der conditions and circumstances subCat Rptr 167; Fibreboard Paper Prod- stantially similar to those under which
ucts Corp. v East Bay Union of Ma- the store in question was operated.
chinists, 227 CA2d 675, 39 Cal Rptr Lucky Auto Supply v Turner, 244
64; Lucky Auto Supply v Turner, 244 CA2d 872, 53 Cal Rptr 628.
CA2d 872, 53 Cal Rptr 628.
As to computation of lost profits,
Malicious interference with a business is a tort for which general damages, including loss of profits and injury to the business* value and reputation, may be recovered to the extent of
the foreseeable consequences of the
wrongdoer's conduct. Drouet v Moulton, 245 CA2d 667, 54 Cal Rptr 278
Law Review: 34 SCLR 310 (loss of
profits as element of damages in action
for unfair competition).
57. Grupe v Glick, 26 C2d 680, 160
P2d 832; Stott v Johnston, 36 C2d

160

see §§ 82, 83, infra.
Forms: Allegation of loss of profits
from injury to business, 8 Am Jur PI
A Pr Forms (Rev) Damages, Form 78;
Instruction to jury on damages for loss
of business profits, 8 Am Jur PI & Pr
Forms (Rev), Damages, Form 159.
Practice Reference: 3 Am Jur Proof
of Facts 491, Damages, Proof 8 (proof
of damages for loss of profits due to
injury to business).
58. California Press Mfg. Co. v Staf

23 Cal Jur 3d
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tort,80 is considered too uncertain to merit compensation.60 A new
business, in contradistinction to an established concern, is regarded in law as simply an adventure/1 which presents a mere
possibility of earning future profits,*1 and the courts will not,
obviously, presume that the profits anticipated from its commencement will actually be realized by the parties to the venture.68 If one engages in a new industry, there are no provable
data of past business from which the fact can be legally deduced
that anticipated profits would have been realized.64 In other
ford Packing Co., 192 C 479, 221 P plicable where plaintiff was awarded
345, 32 ALR 114; Hoag v Jenan, 86 damages on the basis of defendant's
CA2d 556, 195 P2d 451; Handley v infringement of plaintiflTs common law
Guasco, 165 CA2d 703, 332 P2d 354. copyright in his lectures and invasion
of plaintiff's privacy by using plaintiff's
59. Natural Soda Products Co. v name and where the award of damages
Los Angeles, 23 C2d 193, 143 P2d 12, was supported by the testimony of a
cert den 321 US 793, 88 L Ed 1082, witness who had a well-established
64 S Ct 790, reh den 322 US 768, 88 business as a publisher of educational
L Ed 1594, 64 S O 942; Read v
materials. Williams v Weisser, 273
Turner, 239 CA2d 504, 48 Cal Rptr
CA2d 726, 78 Cal Rptr 542, 38
919, 40 ALR3d 237.
ALR3d 761.
60. The rule that, where the operaAnnotation: Measure of damages for
tion of an unestablished business is breach of contract preventing operaprevented or interrupted, damages for tion of nonindustrial business in con*
prospective profits that might other- temptation, but not established or in
wise have been made from its opera- actual operation, 1 ALR 156, §99
tion are not recoverable because their ALR 938.
occurrence is uncertain, contingent,
and speculative, is not an end in itself
61. California Press Mfg. Co. v Stafbut is merely an aid to determination ford Packing Co., 192 C 479, 221 P
of whether the fact of damage, as 345, 32 ALR 114; Handley v Guasco,
distinguished from the amount of 165 CA2d 703, 332 P2d 354.
damage, has been established with rea62. Gibson v Hercules Mfg. A Sales
sonable certainty. Edwards v Container Kraft Carton A Paper Supply Co., 80CA 689, 252P 780.
Co., 161 CA2d 752, 327 P2d 622.
63. Lacy Mfg. Co. v Gold Crown
Perspective profits of a new business Mining Co., 52 CA2d 568, 126 P2d
or venture are too remote, contingent, 644.
jind speculative to meet the legal stan64. Handley v Guasco, 165 CA2d
dards of reasonable certainty. MacMorris Sales Corp. v Kozak, 263 703, 332 P2d 354.
CA2d 430, 69 Cal Rptr 719.
In a government supplier's action
The rule that damages cannot be for breach of an alleged sales contract
measured for prospective profits from for materials needed in his performan unestablished business was not ap- ance of the government contract,
23 Cal Jur 3d

161
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277 Cal.Rptr. 517
John HENDY, et al., Appellants,
v.
Gary LOSSE, M.D., et al., Respondents.
No. SOI8325.
Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.
Jan. 17, 1991.
Prior report CaLApp., 274 Cal.Rptr. 31.
Respondents' petition
for
review
GRANTED.
LUCAS, C.J., and PANELLI,
ARABIAN and BAXTER, JJ., concur.

52 Cal.3d 988
277 Cal.Rptr. 517

HYDROTECH SYSTEMS, LTD.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
OASIS WATERPARK, et al.,
Defendants and
Respondents.
No. S015248.
Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.
Jan. 24, 1991.
Unlicensed subcontractor brought action against owners and general contractor
after retainage on contract to install surfing pool was withheld. The Superior
Court, Riverside County, No. I 54327, Noah
N. Jamin, J., dismissed complaint, and subcontractor appealed. The Court of Appeal,
267 Cal.Rptr. 874, affirmed in part, and
reversed in part and subcontractor sought
review. The Supreme Court granted review, superseding opinion of the Court of
Appeal, and, in opinion by Eagleson, J.,
assigned, held that: (1) statute prohibiting
unlicensed contractor to recover under contract that requires contractor's license con-

tains no implied exception for foreign entities, isolated transactions, or other "exceptional" circumstances, and (2) statute prohibiting unlicensed contractor from recovering under contract that requires contractor's license bars unlicensed contractor's
claim for fraud when primary deceit alleged is false promise to pay, and damages
primarily consist of, or are measured by,
price for value of work and materials furnished.
Judgment of Court of Appeal affirmed
in part and reversed in part
Arabian, J., filed opinion concurring in
judgment.
Broussard, J., filed opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part in which
Panelli, J., joined.

1. Licenses <3=*39.43
Statute prohibiting unlicensed contractor from recovering under contract that
requires contractor's license contains no
implied exception for foreign entities, isolated transactions, or other "exceptional"
circumstances. West's Ann.Cal.Bus. &
Prof.Code § 7031.
2. Licenses <s=*39.44
Statute prohibiting unlicensed contractor from recovering under contract that
requires contractor's license bars unlicensed contractor's claim for fraud when
primary deceit alleged is false promise to
pay, and damages primarily consist of, or
are measured by, price for value of work
and materials furnished West's Ann.Cal.
Bus. & Prof.Code § 7031.
3. Appeal and Error e=»79(2)
Order dismissing fewer than all defendants from action is a "final judgment" as
to them, and is thus appealable. West's
Ann.Cal.C.C.P. § 904.1(a).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
4. Pleading S=*216(l)

If lack of capacity does not appear on
the face of complaint, it cannot be raised

HYDROTECH SYSTEMS v. OASIS WATERPARK

Cal. 3 7 1

Cite as 803 P2d 370 (Cal. 1991)

by demurrer, but is special plea in abatement.
5. Appeal and Error <S=>174
Issue of whether foreign corporation
lacked capacity to sue because its complaint did not allege that it had obtained
required "certificate of qualification" from
Secretary of State was not presented on
appeal, where complaint did not disclose on
its face that corporation had conducted "interstate business" as defined by statute or
failed to obtain any required certificate,
and opposing party did not raise lack of
capacity issue by special plea in abatement.
West's Ann.Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code § 7031;
West's Ann.Cal.C.C.P. § 904.1(a); West's
Ann.Cal.Corp.Code
§§ 191(cX8), 2105,
2203(c).
6. Licenses <3=>39.43
Statute barring unlicensed contractors
from recovering under contract that requires contractor's license applied to unlicensed out-of-state subcontractor hired to
construct surfing pool in California, despite*
isolated nature of transaction and subcontractor's unique skills, where subcontractor
did not substantially comply with licensing
statutes. West's Ann.Cal.Bus. & Prof.
Code § 7031.
7. Licenses <s==39.43
Purpose of licensing law is to protect
public from incompetence and dishonesty in
those who provide building and construction services; licensing requirements provide minimal assurance that all persons
offering such services in California have
requisite skill and character, understand
applicable local laws and codes, and know
rudiments of administering contracting
business. West's Ann.Cal.Bus. & Prof.
Code §§ 7026, 7031, 7040 et seq.
8. Licenses «>39.43
Statute barring unlicensed contractor
from recovering under contract that requires contractor's license precludes unlicensed subcontractor from recovering compensation for his or her work from either
owner or general contractor. West's Ann.
Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code § 7031.

9. Licenses <£=>39.44
Statute prohibiting unlicensed contractor from recovering under contract that
requires contractor's license barred unlicensed out-of-state subcontractor from recovering against general contractor for
work performed on contract to install surfing pool on fraud theory. West's Ann.Cal.
Bus. & Prof.Code § 7031.
10. Licenses <S=>39.44
Regardless of the equities, statute prohibiting unlicensed contractor from recovering under contract that requires contractor's license bars all actions, however they
are characterized, which effectively seek
compensation for illegal unlicensed contract work; thus, unlicensed contractor
cannot recover either for agreed contract
price or for reasonable value of labor and
materials. West's Ann.Cal.Bus. & Prof.
Code § 7031.
11. Licenses <S=>39.43
Statute prohibiting unlicensed contractor from recovering under contract that
requires contractor's license operates even
where person for wrhom work was performed knew contractor was unlicensed.
West's Ann.Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code § 7031.
12. Licenses <s=>39.43
Unlicensed contractor may not circumvent clear provisions and purposes of statute prohibiting unlicensed contractor from
recovering under contract that requires
contractor's license simply by alleging that
when illegal contract was made, other party had no intention of performing; statute
places risk of such bad faith squarely on
unlicensed contractor's shoulders. West's
Ann.Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code § 7031.
13. Corporations <S=*46
Object of fictitious name statute is simply to ensure that those who do business
with persons operating under fictitious
name will know true identities of individuals with whom they are dealing or to whom
they are giving credit or becoming bound;
statute's purpose is not served by extending its protection to one who committed
tort against fictitiously named business.
West's Ann.Cal.Bus. & Prof.Code § 17918.
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Sanger & Stein, and Rick M. Stein, Palm
Springs, for plaintiff and appellant.
Schlecht, Shevlin & Shoenberger, John C.
Shevlin, Palm Springs, Alvarado, Rus &
McClellan and Joel S. Miliband, Orange, for
defendants and respondents.
EAGLESON, Justice.*
Section 7031 of the Business and Professions Code ! states that one may not sue in
a California court to recover "compensation" for "any act or contract" that requires a California contractor's license, unless he "alleges and proves" he was duly
licensed at all times during his performance. We granted review to decide two
questions. The first is whether section
7031 permits an unlicensed nonresident to
sue upon an "isolated transaction" in California where "exceptional circumstances"
exist, even though there was no substantial
compliance with California's licensing law.
The second—an issue of potentially broad
importance—is whether section 7031 bars
an unlicensed contractor's fraud action
against the person for whom the work was
done.
[1,2] We conclude, as did the Court of
Appeal, that section 7031 contains no implied exception for foreign entities, isolated
transactions, or other "exceptional" circumstances. We also hold, contrary to the
Court of Appeal, that the statute bars an
unlicensed contractor's claim for fraud
when the primary deceit alleged is a false
promise to pay, and the damages primarily
consist of, or are measured by, the price or
value of the work and materials furnished.
Any other result would circumvent the
clear statutory policy of deterring unlicensed contract work. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part the decision
of the Court of Appeal.

designed to simulate ocean waves. Hydrotech claims that its product, and its skills at
installing and maintaining the equipment,
are unique. Defendant Oasis Waterpark
(Oasis), a California corporation, owns and
operates a water-oriented amusement park
in Palm Springs. Defendant Wessman
Construction Company, Inc. (Wessman)
was Oasis Waterpark's general contractor
for construction of the park.
In July 1985, Hydrotech contracted with
Wessman to design and construct in the
park a 29,000-square-foot "surfing pool"
using Hydrotech wave equipment The total contract price was $850,000. Wessman
was entitled to hold back specified portions
of this amount pending satisfactory completion and operation of the pool.
Hydrotech later sued Wessman, and Oasis Waterpark and its principals (collectively Oasis). Hydrotech's suit claimed that
more than $110,000 in "retainage" amounts
were still being withheld although the pool
had long since been completed and was
performing as specified.
The second
amended complaint, filed November 29,
1988, asserted claims against all defendants for fraud, breach of implied contract,
and money due and owing, and against
Wessman for breach of written contract
The complaint also asserted that full payment had been made for Hydrotech's construction services, and that the unpaid balance was only for equipment and materials.

FACTS
Plaintiff Hydrotech Systems, Inc. (Hydrotech), a New York corporation, manufactures and installs patented equipment

In its fraud count, Hydrotech alleged as
follows: Because it was concerned about
licensing problems, Hydrotech wished only
to sell and deliver its equipment and to
avoid involvement in design or construction
of the pool. However, Oasis insisted that
Hydrotech's unique expertise in design and
construction was essential. To induce Hydrotech to contract for these services, and
"in response to repeated queries by Hydrotech," defendants promised that Wessman
would arrange for a California contractor
to "work with" Hydrotech on any construc-

* Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of
the Judicial Council.

1. All further statutory references are to the
Business and Professions Code unless otherwise
indicated.
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Hon activities which required a California
license. Defendants also promised to pay
to full for Hydrotech's wave equipment and
f0r "associated equipment and services/'
in reasonable reliance on these promises,
which defendants never intended to honor,
jjydrotech furnished equipment and services in full compliance with its contract.
jj a( j Hydrotech known defendants' promises were false when made, it would not
have performed under the contract, and
therefore suffered damage according to
proof.
Defendants demurred on grounds, inter
alia, that the complaint failed to allege
Hydrotech possessed a California contractor's license. Hydrotech conceded it had
no California license. However, Hydrotech
asserted that it sought only unpaid
amounts for sale of equipment, for which a
license was not required.2 In the alternative, Hydrotech claimed that application of
section 7031 was unnecessary and unjust
because Hydrotech possesses unique expertise in its field and provided construction
services only at its customer's insistence.
Hydrotech also argued that section 7031
does not bar tort actions for fraud.

without leave to amend. The trial court
entered an order dismissing all defendants
save Wessman from the action.
[3] Hydrotech appealed the dismissal
order.3 It argued first that the protective
purposes of the licensing law are not
served by applying section 7031 to a nonresident who subcontracted at its customer's specific request to provide unique construction skills in an "isolated" California
transaction. Hydrotech also repeated its
contention that section 7031 does not bar
claims of fraudulent inducement to enter a
construction contract.
The Court of Appeal rejected the former
argument but accepted the latter. It reversed that portion of the trial court's judgment which dismissed Hydrotech's fraud
count, but affirmed the dismissal of Hydrotech's complaint in all other respects.
[4,5] Hydrotech sought review on the
"isolated transaction" issue, and defendants sought review on the fraud question.
We granted both petitions. As we explain,
defendants' contentions have merit, but
Hydrotech's do not 4
DISCUSSION

The trial court sustained Wessman's demurrer to the written-contract count but
granted Hydrotech leave to amend. The
demurrers to all other causes of action in
Hydrotech's complaint were sustained

1. Section 70S1 applies despite the "exceptional circumstances" of this
transaction,
[6] Hydrotech renews its contention
that the "exceptional circumstances" of its

2. Hydrotech has not renewed this contention on
appeal.

ed it did not have to reach the qualification
issue because it had held that Hydrotech's contract claims were barred in any event by section
7031. This analysis overlooks the fact that the
appellate court did exempt Hydrotech's fraud
claim from section 7031. Nonetheless, the qualification issue is not presented by this appeal.
Unless the governing statute states otherwise, a
complaint need not allege the plaintiffs capacity
to sue. If lack of capacity does not appear on
the face of the complaint, it cannot be raised by
demurrer, but is a special plea in abatement
(See, e.g., Traub Co. v. Coffee Break Service, Inc.
(1967) 66 Cal.2d 368, 370, 57 Cal.Rptr. 846, 425
P.2d 790; Haley & Co. v. McVay (1924) 70 Cal.
App. 438, 440, 233 P. 409; 5 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Pleading, §§ 1055-1056, pp.
470-471.) Hydrotech's complaint does not disclose on its face that Hydrotech has conducted
"intrastate business" as defined by statute (see
Corp.Code, § 191, subd. (c)(8)), or that it failed
to obtain any required certificate. Thus, no
further discussion of the qualification issue is
warranted.

3. Because Wessman was not dismissed from the
suit, it is not a party to the appeal. There is no
doubt, of course, that an order dismissing fewer
than all defendants from an action is a "final
judgment" as to them, and is thus appealable.
(Code Civ.Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a); Justus v.
Atchison (1977) 19 CaUd 564, 568, 139 Cal.Rptr.
97, 565 P.2d 122; Seidner v. 1551 Greenfield
Owners Assn. (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 895, 901902, 166 CaLRptr. 803; Tinsley v. Palo Alto Unified School Dist. (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 871, 880,
154 CaLRptr. 591.)
4. Oasis demurred specially on the additional
ground that the complaint failed to show Hydrotech's capacity to sue because it did not
allege that Hydrotech, as a foreign corporation
conducting "intrastate business," had obtained
the required "certificate of qualideation" from
the Secretary of State. (Corp.Code, §§ 2105,
2203, subd. (c).) The Court of Appeal conclud-
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dealings with Oasis make application of
section 7031 unnecessary and unjust. Hydrotech points to its allegations that it reluctantly provided construction services on
a one-time basis only because Oasis solicited its specialized wave-generation expertise, which was available nowhere else.
Hydrotech argues that the "isolated" provision of such specialized services by a mere
subcontractor should be deemed exempt
from section 7031. The law, however, is
otherwise.

acter, understand applicable local laws and
codes, and know the rudiments of administering a contracting business. (Ibid.; Conderback, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. (1966)
239 Cal.App.2d 664, 678-679, 48 CaLRptr.
901.)

Section 7031 advances this purpose by
withholding judicial aid from those who
seek compensation for unlicensed contract
work. The obvious statutory intent is to
discourage persons who have failed to c*om-4
ply with the licensing law from offering or
Section 7031 states clearly that, with ex- providing their unlicensed services for pay.
ceptions not relevant here, "[n]o person
Because of the strength and clarity of
engaged in the business or acting in the this policy, it is well settled that section
capacity of a contractor, may bring or 7031 applies despite injustice to the unlimaintain any action" in a California censed contractor. "Section 7031 reprecourt to recover "compensation for the per- sents a legislative determination that the
formance of any act or contract for which a importance of deterring unlicensed persons
[contractor's] license is required . . . with- from engaging in the contracting business
out alleging and proving" that he or she outweighs any harshness between the par"was a duly licensed contractor at all times ties, and that . . . such deterrance can best
during the performance of [the] act or con- be realized by denying violators the right
t r a c t . . . . " (Italics added.)
to maintain any action for compensation in
Section 7026 provides that, for purposes the courts of this state. [Citation.] . . . "
of the license requirements, "a contractor {Lewis & Queen, supra, 48 Cal.2d at p.
is any person, who undertakes to or offers 151, 308 P.2d 713, italics added; see also
to undertake to . . . , or does himself or by Brown v. Solano County Business Develor through others, construct . . . any . . . opment, Inc. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 192, 198,
structure, project, development or improve- 154 Cal.Rptr. 700; Rushing v. Powell
ment, or to do any part thereof, . . . wheth- (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 597, 605, 130 Cal.Rptr.
er or not the performance of [such] work 110.)
. . . involves the addition to or fabrication
Hydrotech concedes that it had no Caliinto any [such] structure, project, develop- fornia license, yet seeks contract compensament or improvement . . . of any material tion for activities which required such a
or article of merchandise. The term con- license. It simply urges that California
tractor includes subcontractor and special- courts have recognized "exceptional cirty contractor." (Italics added.) The nu- cumstances" in which literal application of
merous express exemptions from the li- section 7031 would not further the purcensing law (§ 7040 et seq.) do not include poses of the licensing law.
foreign contractors, isolated transactions,
However, the authorities Hydrotech cites
or "unique" building services and capabiliall relate to the well-established doctrine of
ties.
substantial compliance. Under this rule,
[7] The purpose of the licensing law is a contractor was not barred from a just
to protect the public from incompetence recovery if his licensure was defective only
and dishonesty in those who provide build- inform and the defendant had received the
ing and construction services. {Lewis & "full measure" of protection intended by
Queen v. N.M. Ball Sons (1957) 48 Cal.2d the Legislature. (E.g., Asdourian v. Araj
141, 149-150, 308 P.2d 713.) The licensing (1985) 38 Cal.3d 276, 282-289, 211 Cal.Rptr.
requirements provide minimal assurance 703, 696 P.2d 95; Latipac, Inc. v. Superior
that all persons offering such services in Court (1966) 64 Cal.2d 278, 49 Cal.Rptr.
California have the requisite skill and char- 676, 411 P.2d 564; Gatti v. Highland Park
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Builders, Inc. (1946) 27 Cal.2d 687, 166
P.2d 265.)
Such is not the case here. The protective
purposes of the licensing law cannot be
satisfied in full measure unless the "continuing competence and responsibility" of
those engaged in the work for which compensation is sought have been officially
examined and favorably resolved. (See,
e.g., Asdourian, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp.
285-289, 211 CaLRptr. 703, 696 P.2d 95.)
Hydrotech does not state that it ever
sought or obtained any such favorable official determination of its qualifications, or
those of its agents involved in the pool
construction. There is no basis for an inference that the law's full protective purposes were served despite the entire absence of necessary licensure. Hence, Hydrotech has not alleged its "substantial"
compliance with the licensing law.5
Hydrotech claims the law's interests in
competence and public protection were not
disserved in this case because its agreement to design and construct the surfing
pool for Oasis was an "isolated" California
transaction. However, as the Court of Appeal observed, "It is manifest that the concern for the public inherent in section 7031
is just as applicable to a project done by an
out-of-state contractor with few jobs in California as to a project done by a California
contractor who performs only one job in
California before going out of business."
That Hydrotech's activities in California
were "isolated" is not clear from the pleadings, but even if they were, there is no
implied exception for "isolated" transactions by foreign contractors. (Cf. Power
City Communications, Inc. v. Calaveras
Telephone Co. (E.D.Cal.1968) 280 F.Supp.
808 [§ 7031 bars federal diversity suit by
Washington contractor for value of unlicensed California work].)
5. Significantly, after the contract here at issue
was made and performed, the Legislature concluded that the judicial doctrine of substantial
compliance does not adequately serve the protective purposes of section 7031. In 1989, the
Legislature amended section 7031 to provide
that the substantial-compliance rule "shall not
apply to this section." (§ 7031, subd. (d); Stats.
1989, ch. 368, § 1, No. 4 Deering's Adv.Legis.
Service, pp. 1262-1263.)
803 P 2d—10

Hydrotech also begs the question by suggesting that Oasis' need for its unique
skills should exempt it from section 7031.
As noted, the licensing law achieves its
protective purpose by requiring that a contractors competence and qualifications,
however unique, be examined and certified
by the expert agency charged with the
law's enforcement
Hydrotech's "reluctance" to engage in
design and construction activities, and Oasis' insistence that it do so, are also irrelevant. Perhaps Hydrotech's good faith alters the balance of equities in its favor. As
we have seen, however, the deterrent purpose of section 7031 outweighs any harshness in a particular case.1
[8] Finally, we dismiss Hydrotech's
claim that the law's protective purpose was
served because Hydrotech acted only as a
subcontractor and did not hold itself out to
the public. Subcontractors are governed
as such by the licensing law. (§ 7026.)
Both owners and general contractors are
entitled to protection against illegal subcontract work by unlicensed persons.
Hence, an unlicensed subcontractor may
not recover compensation for his work
from either the owner or the general contractor. {Lewis & Queen, supra, 48 Cal.2d
at pp. 152-154, 308 P.2d 713; see Pickens
v. American Mortgage Exchange (1969)
269 Cal.App.2d 299, 302, 74 Cal.Rptr. 788.)
We therefore conclude, as did the Court
of Appeal, that Hydrotech has alleged no
"exceptional circumstances" which would
exempt it from the operation of section
7031.
2. Section 7031 bars Hydrotech's fraud
claim.
[9] The Court of Appeal accepted Hydrotech's alternative claim that even if sec6. Again, the Legislature recently underscored its
insistence on a strict application of section 7031
despite the balance of equities. The 1989
amendments make clear that an unlicensed contractor may not recover either "in law or equity," and that suit is barred "regardless of the
M
merits of the cause of action
(§ 7031,
subd. (a), as designated and amended by Stats.
1989, ch. 368, § 1, No. 4 Deering's Adv.Legis.
Service, pp. 1262-1263.)
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tion 7031 eliminates contractual and quasicontractual claims seeking "compensation"
for unlicensed work, it does not bar Hydrotech's recovery of tort damages arising
from defendants' fraud which induced Hydrotech to contract and perform. Defendants assert that the Court of Appeal thus
erred. We agree.
[10,11] Regardless of the equities, section 7031 bars all actions, however they are
characterized, which effectively seek "compensation" for illegal unlicensed contract
work. (Lewis & Queen, supra, 48 Cal.2d
at pp. 150-152, 308 P.2d 713.) Thus, an
unlicensed contractor cannot recover either
for the agreed contract price or for the
reasonable value of labor and materials.
(See Davis Co. v. Superior Court (1969) 1
Cal.App.3d 156, 159, 81 Cal.Rptr. 453;
Grant v. Weatherholt (1954) 123 Cal.
App.2d 34, 41-42, 266 P.2d 185.) The statutory prohibition operates even where the
person for whom the work was performed
knew the contractor was unlicensed.
(Pickens, supra, 269 Cal.App.2d at p. 302,
74 Cal.Rptr. 788; Cash v. Blackett (1948)
87 Cal.App.2d 233, 196 P.2d 585.)
[12] It follows that an unlicensed contractor may not circumvent the clear provisions and purposes of section 7031 simply
by alleging that when the illegal contract
was made, the other party had no intention
of performing. Section 7031 places the
risk of such bad faith squarely on the unlicensed contractor's shoulders. "Knowing
that they will receive no help from the
courts and must trust completely to each
other's good faith, the parties are less likely to enter an illegal arrangement in the
first place. [Citations.]" (Lewis & Queen,
supra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 150, 308 P.2d 713,
italics added.)
Hydrotech alleges that it was induced to
enter and perform an illegal contract by a
false promise to pay; that it would not
have performed had it known the promise
was false when made; and that it therefore
suffered damage "according to proof."
The complaint states no facts suggesting
that the "damage" to be proven and recovered is anything other than that asserted
elsewhere in the complaint—i.e., the unpaid

contract balance or its quantum meruit
equivalent.
In sum, Hydrotech proposes that defendants' unenforceable promise to pay for
illegal work is actionable because defendants made the promise in bad faith. Such
transparent pleading cannot be used to
avoid section 7031.
The Court of Appeal concluded that disallowance of fraud claims like Hydrotech's
would contravene the protective policies of
the licensing law by encouraging professional contractors such as Wessman to
seek out unlicensed subcontractors, secure
in the knowledge that the work obtained
would not have to be compensated. Justice
Broussard expresses similar concerns that
such a result would encourage the cheating
of unlicensed contractors. (Dis. opn. of
Broussard, J,, post, at pp. 526, 528, 530
of 277 Cal.Rptr., at pp. 379, 381, 383 of
803 P.2d.) We are not persuaded, however.
A general contractor may be disciplined for
subcontracting with knowledge that the
subcontractor is unlicensed. (§ 7118.)
Moreover, the unusual circumstances of
this case aside, it is unlikely that a rational
general contractor would intentionally risk
liability for claims that his unlicensed subcontractor had performed substandard
work.
In any event, the statutory disallowance
of claims for payment by unlicensed subcontractors is intended to deter such persons from offering their services, or accepting solicitations of their work. That
policy applies regardless of whether the
other party's promise to pay for the work
was honest or deceitful.
Hydrotech suggests that the allowance
of fraud claims would not nullify the protective purposes of section 7031 because, in
many cases, unlicensed contractors would
not be able to prove that the promise to
pay was false when made, or that reliance
on the fraudulent promise was "justified."
(See, e.g., Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc.
(1985) 39 Cal.3d 18, 30, 216 Cal.Rptr. 130,
702 P.2d 212.) The point, however, is that
the deterrent and protective purposes of
section 7031 preclude recovery even when
the person who solicited the unlicensed
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did act in bad faith. (See Lewis & formed by him, but for acts of the defensupra, 48 Cal.2d at p. 150, 308 P.2d dants which resulted in his being deceived
In other words, the falsity of the and damaged...." (Id., at p. 44, 266 P.2d
to pay is irrelevant, and the unli- 185.) Among the "damages" recoverable,
contractor will not be heard to say the court concluded, wrere the "money and
•t he "reasonably" relied upon it.7
services" plaintiff had advanced in reliance
fgydrotech relies heavily on three Court on the false representation. (Id., at pp.
# Appeal decisions suggesting in particu- 44-45, 266 P.2d 185.)
, contexts that section 7031 does not bar
In situations similar to Grant's, two oth^unlicensed contractor's claims for fraud.
er
Courts of Appeal have also upheld fraud
Ye are not persuaded that those cases
claims
by unlicensed contractors. In
Qtrol our ruling here.
Brunzell
Constr. Co, v. Barton DevelopGrant v. Weatherholt, supra, 123
ment
Co.
(1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 442, 49
;5iLApp.2d 34, 266 P.2d 185, owners of
Cal.Rptr.
667,
a contractor licensed only in
Ijaiideveloped land persuaded plaintiff, who
%fii& not a licensed contractor, to invest in a Nevada agreed to construct an apartment
development venture. Plaintiff advanced building on defendants' California property
funds, performed improvement work, and in return for cash and notes. Defendants
furnished materials, based on promises and the contractor planned a joint venture
that his compensation would be credited to own and operate the building. The contoward the purchase price of a homesite. tractor was to invest in the venture by
^The owners had represented that the land surrendering some of its notes for the conwas free of encumbrances, though in fact it tract price. After the contractor incurred
was subject to a $25,000 deed of trust preliminary expenses, but before construcWhen the deed of trust was foreclosed,
tion actually began, defendants sold the
plaintiff sued for breach of contract and
land. The contractor sued for anticipatory
also sought tort damages for defendants'
false representation of the state of title. breach and for fraud, alleging that defendants had concealed the sale negotiations.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the con- The court rejected the contractual claims as
tractual count but upheld the fraud claim. barred by section 7031. However, citing
The court declared that section 7031 bars
Grant, the Court of Appeal ruled that if
only claims "based upon contract liability"
plaintiff
had been induced to enter an arand does not shield persons who contract
rangement
defendants never intended to
with unlicensed contractors from responsiperform,
a
claim
for fraud would lie. "In
bility for their own torts. (123 CaI.App.2d
such
case,
plaintiffs
[anticipatory] expendiat p. 43, 266 P.2d 185.) In the Grant
court's view, plaintiffs fraud cause of ac- tures would serve as a measure of compention sought recovery not "for any act per- satory damages . . . , although not recovera7. In Tenzer, supra, this court held that an unlicensed finder of real estate could sue in fraud
upon oral promises of a finder's fee, even
though his contractual claim was barred by the
statute of frauds. (See former Civ.Code,
§ 1624, subd. 5, now § 1624, subd. (d).) Among
other things, we reasoned that an unlicensed
person, insofar as he seeks compensation for
activities which require no license, should not be
held rigidly to constructive knowledge that a
finder's fee agreement must be in writing. (39
Cal 3d at pp. 27-28, 216 Cal.Rptr. 130, 702 P.2d
212; compare Phillippe v. Shapell Industries
(1987) 43 Cal.3d 1247, 1259-1264, 241 Cal.Rptr.
22, 743 P.2d 1279 [licensed broker barred from
asserting equitable theory to enforce oral commission agreement].) We also concluded in
Tenzer that a statute designed to prevent fraud

should not be applied to encourage it, and that
the difficulties of proving fraud would prevent
nullification of the requirement of a written
agreement. (39 Cal.3d at pp. 2&-31, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 130, 702 P.2d 212.) Tenzer is no basis for
a determination that unlicensed contractors
may sue for fraud. The protective purposes of
the licensing law would be nullified if unlicensed contractors were not held to knowledge
of its requirements. Moreover, while the statute of frauds addresses only the formality of
covered agreements, section 7031 seeks to deter
any compensated work by an unlicensed contractor. Indeed, Tenzer itself distinguished the
situation where an unlicensed person seeks recovery for activities requiring a license. (39
Cal 3d at p. 31, 216 Cal.Rptr. 130, 702 P.2d 212.)
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ble as compensation under the con-itract...." (P. 446, 49 Cal.Rptr. 667.)
Pickens v. American Mortgage Exchange, supra, 269 Cal.App.2d 299, 74 Cal.I
Rptr. 788, presented facts almost identical,1
to those in Grant Plaintiff, an unlicensedi
contractor, alleged he changed his resi-idence and did remodeling work on defendants' property in reliance on promises thatt
he would have an option to buy the property and that his labor and expenses would\
be credited against the purchase price. Ac-•cording to plaintiff, defendants told himl
the property was encumbered by a $30,000)
trust deed but failed to mention an additional $25,000 encumbrance; they also)
promised to pay but never intended to do)
so. Relying on Grant, the Court of Appeal1
held that these omissions and misrepresen-•
tations, if proved, would support a fraud1
claim not barred by section 7031. (Pp.
303-304, 74 Cal.Rptr. 788.)

naive, overbroad, unsupported by the authority cited,8 and impossible to reconcile
with our reasoning in Lewis & Queen, $upro, 48 Cal.2d 141, 308 P.2d 713.*

Nonetheless, we stop short of disapproving Grant, Brunzell, and Pickens insofar
as they might apply to this case. The
Legislature amended section 7031 several
times between 1954, the year Grant was
decided, and 1986, the year Hydrotech apparently finished its unlicensed work for
Oasis. During that time, however, the
Legislature expressed no disagreement
with this line of decisions. The Legisla-j
ture's inaction is some indication that it)
accepted existing judicial limitations on sec- •
tion 7031. (See, e.g., Wilkoff v. Superior
Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 345, 353, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 742, 696 P.2d 134; People v. Hallner
(1954) 43 Cal.2d 715, 719, 277 P.2d 393.)
We conclude, however, that Grant and
its progeny are properly interpreted in the
[13] Dicta in these decisions suggest; context of their particular facts. In each
that tort damages are not prohibited "com- case, the plaintiffs involvement as an unlipensation," and that section 7031 is inappli- censed contractor was incidental to the
cable whenever the unlicensed contractor• overall agreement or transaction between
asserts he was induced to do illegal work the parties. By the same token, the priby "fraudulent" promises or representa- mary fraud alleged in each case was extertions. Taken out of context, such a rule is nal to the arrangement for construction
8. In support of its premise that licensing statutes do not bar tort claims by the unlicensed
person, Grant cited In re Dennery (1891) 89 Cal.
101, 26 P. 639, Ralph v. Lockwood (1882) 61 Cal.
155, Thompson v. Byers (1931) 116 CaLApp. 214,
2 P.2d 496, and Reeves v. First Nat. Bank (1912)
20 CaLApp. 508, 129 P. 800. None of those
cases construed section 7031, however. Rather,
all were concerned with the statute barring suit
by a business on its contracts or transactions
under a fictitious name, until a fictitious-name
certificate has been obtained. (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 17918 [formerly Civ.Code, § 2468].)
The two statutory schemes are materially distinct. Failure to comply with the fictitiousname statutes does not make the parties' promises, agreements, and transactions invalid as
such Noncompliance merely prevents a fictitiously named business from enforcing obligations owed to it until it places on record its
true nature and ownership. The object of Business and Professions Code section 17918 is simply to ensure that those who do business with
persons operating under a fictitious name will
know the true identities of "the individuals with
whom they are dealing or to whom they are
giving credit or becoming bound." (Asdourian
v. Arajt supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 289, fn. 8, 211
Cal.Rptr. 703, 696 P.2d 95, quoting Levelon

Builders, Inc. v. Lynn (1961) 194 Cal.App.2d 657,
662-663, 15 Cal.Rptr. 582.) The statute's purpose is not served by extending its protection to
one who committed a tort against a fictitiously
named business. On the other hand, because of
the dangers of incompetence and dishonesty, it
is illegal to perform compensated work without
a required license; the inducement or consideration offered for the work is thus invalid and
unenforceable ah initio. (See Lewis & Queen,
supra, 48 Cal 2d at pp. 151-154, 308 P.2d 713.)
That the inducement was falsely offered should
make no difference.
9. Justice Broussard asserts that we rely too
heavily upon Lewis & Queen because that decision expressly recognizes situations in which
denial of an unlicensed contractor's just claim
would not serve the purposes of section 7031.
(Dis. opn. of Broussard, J., post, at p. 529 of 277
Cal.Rptr., at p. 382 of 803 P.2d.) However,
Lewis <6 Queen makes clear that any claim
against a person protected by the licensing law
(i.e., a client of the unlicensed contractor) "falls
squarel> within section 7031"; in such cases,
"courts may not resort to equitable considerations in defiance of [the statute]
" (48
Cal.2d at p. 152, 308 P.2d 713.)
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work as such, and was thus unrelated to
any protective concern of the licensing law.
Under these extraordinary circumstances,
the Courts of Appeal understandably concluded that the peripheral involvement of
unlicensed contract work did not shield defendants from all tort liability.
No California case has squarely held that
an unlicensed contractor may transform a
barred claim into a permissible one simply
by alleging that the unenforceable promises of payment which induced him to perform were false when made. For reasons
already stated, we decline to extend
Grant *s reasoning to the situation presented here. In a garden-variety dispute over
money owed an unlicensed contractor, the
contractor cannot evade section 7031 by
alleging that the express or implied promise to pay for his work was fraudulent.10
However artful the pleadings, if the primary fraud alleged is a false promise to
pay for unlicensed construction work, and
the primary relief sought is compensation
for the work, section 7031 bars the action.11
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is
reversed insofar as it upholds Hydrotech's
cause of action for fraud, and affirmed in
all other respects.
LUCAS, C.J., and MOSK and
KENNARD, JJ., concur.
ARABIAN, Associate Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the judgment
However, rather than attempt to distinguish the three Court of Appeal decisions
on which Hydrotech relies (Grant v.
Weatherholt (1954) 123 Cal.App.2d 34, 266
P.2d 185; Brunzell Const Co. v. Barton
Development Co. (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d

442, 49 Cal.Rptr. 667; Pickens v. American Mortgage Exchange (1969) 269 Cal.
App.2d 299, 74 Cal.Rptr. 788), I would overrule them as patently inconsistent with the
statutory language and intent The mere
fact that the legislature did not act to overrule these cases does not imply legislative
approval. As we have pointed out on more
than one occasion, "something more than
mere silence should be required before that
acquiescence is elevated into a species of
implied legislation." (People v. Daniels
(1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1127-1128, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225; accord Cianci v.
Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 923,
221 Cal.Rptr. 575, 710 P.2d 375; MoradiShalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 300-301, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 116, 758 P.2d 58.)
RROUSSARD, Associate Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree with the majority insofar as they
hold that Business and Professions Code
section 7031 (hereafter section 7031) bars
plaintiffs actions for breach of contract,
breach of implied contract, and money due
and owing.
However, I must dissent from the determination that the fraud cause of action is
also barred. The language of section 7031
has been repeatedly construed by the
Courts of Appeal to permit actions for
fraud, and the Legislature, despite amending the code section in other respects, has
not changed the crucial language. Under
the reenactment rule this should end the
case. In any event, sound policy requires
that the section should not be construed to
bar any fraud claims. The majority's holding, barring some fraud claims but not
others, not only rewards fraudulent wrongdoers, but defeats the protective policies of

11. Nor can Hydrotech claim tort damages stem10. Though the point is not crucial to our holdming from reasonable reliance on false proming, we note again the Legislature's recent conises that Oasis and Wessman would arrange for
firmation that it intends section 7031 to operate
a licensed California contractor to "work with"
regardless of the form of action attempted, and
"regardless of the merits of the [unlicensed con- Hydrotech on the pool project. Even if such an
arrangement might then have "substantially
tractor's] cause of action
" (§ 7031, subd.
complied" with the licensing requirements, Hy(a); Stats,1989, ch. 368, § 1, No. 4 Deering's
drotech chose to perform unlicensed contractAdv.Legis.Service, pp. 1262-1263, italics added.)
ing activities despite the obvious absence of the
promised California licensee.
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the code section by encouraging intentional
wrongdoers to seek out and hire unlicensed
contractors, secure in the knowledge that
the work need not be compensated.
The complaint clearly alleges a fraudulent scheme whereby defendants with the
intent of avoiding payment under their contract insisted that Hydrotech, known to be
unlicensed, engage in contracting work for
which a license was required. This is not a
case where Hydrotech solicited work in
California. Hydrotech did not hold itself
out as licensed to contract for the design
and construction of the pool. Indeed, Hydrotech refused to engage in contracting
work. Hydrotech sought only to sell wavemaking equipment and sought to avoid involvement in design or construction. Defendants insisted that Hydrotech's unique
expertise in design and construction was
essential and refused to contract without
Hydrotech's services. All parties were
aware that Hydrotech had a licensing problem. To induce Hydrotech to perform, defendants promised, in addition to paying
for the equipment, that arrangements
would be made for a California contractor
to "work with" Hydrotech on any construction activities which required a California
license. Defendants never intended to, and
did not, perform their promises. In reliance on defendants' false promises, Hydrotech furnished the equipment and services in full compliance with the contract
Now defendants, who solicited the contracting services aware that Hydrotech could
not lawfully engage in them, seek unjust
enrichment because Hydrotech succumbed
to their fraudulent promises.
Section 7031 provided at the times relevant here: "No person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a contractor, may bring or maintain any action in
any court of this state for the collection of
compensation for the performance of any
act or contract for which a license is
required by this chapter without alleging
and proving that he was a duly licensed
contractor at all times during the performance of such act or contract, except that
such prohibition shall not apply to contractors who are each individually licensed un-

der this chapter but fail to comply with
Section 7029." (Italics added.)
Until today, it was settled that section
7031 did not preclude actions for fraud.
(Pickens v. American Mortgage Exchange
(1969) 269 Cal.App 2d 299, 302-304, 74 Cal.
Rptr. 788; Brunzell Constr. Co. v. Barton
Development Co. (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d
442, 446, 49 Cal.Rptr. 667; Grant i>.
Weatherholt (1954) 123 Cal.App 2d 34, 4244, 266 P.2d 185.) In the leading case of
Grant v. Weatherholt, supra, the court
reasoned: "Plaintiffs cause of action for
fraud is not 'for the collection of compensation for the performance of any act or
contract for which a license is required/
Plaintiffs right is the outgrowth of the
deceit practiced upon him by the defendants. The validity or invalidity of his
contract does not affect that right. Proof
of the contract under the cause of action
for fraud was merely proof of the circumstances under which plaintiffs services
were rendered and his money was expended.
"Plaintiffs action for fraud is not barred
by the provision of the above sections of
the Business and Professions Code. The
sections should be construed and applied so
as to accomplish their purpose of protecting the public from dealings with incompetent or untrustworthy contractors. The
courts will not impose penalties for noncompliance in addition to those that are
provided expressly or by necessary implication. The rule expressio unius exclusio
alterius has application. [Citations.] The
sections of the code which shield from liability those who enter into contracts with
unlicensed persons do not purport to shield
them from responsibility for their own
torts, nor do they relate to actions or proceedings except those that are based upon
contract liability
Inasmuch as plaintiffs action for fraud is not for the recovery of compensation under the contract or
for breach of it, the fact that he was not
licensed at all times does not bar his recovery. He does not sue for any act performed by him, but for acts of the defendants which resulted in his being deceived
and damaged/' (123 Cal.App.2d at pp. 4344, 266 P.2d 185; see Pickens v. American
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Mortgage Exchange, supra, 269 Cal.
App.2d 299, 303-304, 74 Cal.Rptr. 788.)

Even if the reenactment rule were not
controlling, the reasoning of the cases is
compelling.

Moreover, sound policy requires that we
do not go beyond the legislative determination that contract and implied contracts are
barred by section 7031. The purpose of the
section is the enforcement of the contractor's licensing law. The purpose is accomplished under the code by denying the unlicensed contractor the fruits of his labor
and unjustly enriching the other party.
The Legislature has thus established severe sanctions and forfeitures. (Asdourian v. Araj (1985) 38 Cal.3d 276, 282, 211
Cal.Rptr. 703, 696 P.2d 95.) To further the
purpose of deterring unlicensed contractors, the Legislature has provided that the
unlicensed contractor may not recover in a
contract action or implied contract action.
It has never provided that fraudulent
wrongdoers may be rewarded under the
statute or that unlicensed people may not
recover for fraud.
This court should not go beyond the penalties and forfeitures established by the
Legislature and establish additional ones
on its own. The Legislature has not abolished tort remedies such as fraud, and we
should not enrich those who rely upon section 7031 in the perpetration of a fraud or
in the consummation of a fraudulent
scheme. (See Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc.
(1985) 39 Cal.3d 18, 29-30, 216 Cal.Rptr.
130, 702 P.2d 212; Seymour v. Oelrichs
(1909) 156 Cal. 782, 794, 106 P. SS; Southern Cal. etc. Assemblies of God v. Shepherd of Hills etc. Church (1978) 77 Cal.
App.3d 951, 958, fn. 3, 144 Cal.Rptr. 46.)
As the Court of Appeal pointed out in the
instant case, the purpose of section 7031 is
frustrated by holding that fraudulent
wrongdoers may escape their debts by asserting the bar of section 7031. As stated
above, the purpose of section 7031 is to
deter unlicensed persons from engaging in
contracting. Allowing fraudulent wrongdoers to obtain the substantial penalties
and forfeitures and be unjustly enriched
can only encourage owners and contractors

1. The concurring opinion implies that recent
cases have repudiated the reenactment rule.
However, in the cases cited, either there was no
reenactment (People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d
1119, 1127-1128, 80 Cal.Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225)
or the provisions changed in the reenactment

were entirely unrelated to the provision previously construed (MoradiShalal v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 CalJd 287, 300301, 250 Cal.Rptr. 116, 758 P.2d 58; Cianci v.
Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 922-923,
221 Cal.Rptr. 575, 710 P.2d 375).

The reasoning is unanswerable. The majority characterize the reasoning of Pickens, Brunzell Constr. Co. and Grant as
"dicta" (maj. opn., ante, at p. 525 of 277
Ol.Rptr., at p. 378 of 803 P.2d), but this is
the basic reasoning of the cases.
The reenactment rule requires us to follow these cases. " 'Where a statute has
been construed by judicial decision, and
that construction is not altered by subsequent legislation, it must be presumed that
the Legislature is aware of the judicial
construction and approves of it/ (People
v. Hallner (1954) 43 Cal.2d 715, 719 [277
P.2d 393]; People v. Fox (1977) 73 Cal.
App.3d 178, 181 [140 Cal.Rptr. 615].)"
(Wilkoff v. Superior Court (1985) 38
Cal.3d 345, 353, 211 Cal.Rptr. 742, 696 P.2d
134.) Section 7031 has been repeatedly
amended since the 1954 decision in Grant
v. Weatherholt (Stats.1957, ch. 845, § 1, p.
2067; Stats.1961, ch. 1325, § 1, p. 3105;
Stats.1965, ch. 681, § 1, p. 2059; Stats.
1989, ch. 368, § 1, No. 4 Deering's Adv.
Legis. Service, p. 1262), and it has never
provided that fraudulent wrongdoers may
take advantage of the section or that denial
of access to the courts in cases of fraud is
one of the penalties imposed for violation
of the licensing law.
The majority pay lip service to this rule.
In recognition, they say we should not disapprove Grant, Brunzell, and Pickens.
But then they state each should be limited
to its facts. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 525 of
277 Cal.Rptr., at p. 378 of 803 P.2d.) The
reenactment rule has always been that the
judicial "construction" of a statute has
been approved, not merely its application to
specific facts.1
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to engage in fraudulent schemes to hire
unlicensed persons in anticipation that,
when the debts come due, they can turn
their backs and refuse to pay in reliance on
section 7031. As in the instant case, California contractors and owners will be encouraged to seek out and employ unlicensed out-of-state contractors in the hope
of obtaining services without paying for
them. We should not encourage such
wrongdoing. On the other hand, the legislative policy of deterrence is not furthered
by denying recovery for fraud. Unlicensed
contractors are not encouraged to undertake the unlawful activity by the remote
possibility that, if unpaid, they might be
able to prove fraud.
In view of the language of section 7031,
its consistent construction by the Courts of
Appeal, and its history, it is apparent that
the Legislature has balanced the dangers
of encouraging fraud against the violation
of the licensing statute and concluded
against rewarding the fraudulent We
should accept its judgment
The majority rely at length on Lewis &
Queen v. NM Ball Sons (1957) 48 Cal.2d
141, 308 P.2d 713 (maj. opn., ante, at pp.
523, 524, 525 of 277 Cal.Rptr., at pp. 376,
377, 378 of 803 P.2d), but fail to point out
that the court expressly stated that it was
enforcing the terms of the statute and need
not consider whether the harshness of the
forfeiture, the evil of unjust enrichment,
and avoidance of encouraging illegal conduct counselled in favor of enforcing the
illegal contract (48 Cal.2d at pp. 151-152,
308 P.2d 713.) In the course of its discussion, the court expressly recognized that in
some cases "effective deterrence is best
realized by enforcing the plaintiffs claim
rather than leaving the defendant in possession of the benefit" (48 Cal.2d at p.
151, 308 P.2d 713.) In short, Lewis &
Queen avoided the question whether courts
in the absence of a statutory provision imposing a forfeiture penalty would refuse to
enforce the illegal contracts violating the
licensing law.
The case is of little help to the fhajority.
The majority go beyond the words of the
statute, as we have seen. Thus, the major-

ity must show that "effective deterrence is
best realized" by leaving the defendant in
possession of the benefit They fail to do
so.
The majority appear to take the position
that the provisions of section 7031 will be
rendered meaningless if an unlicensed contractor can avoid them by alleging fraud.
The argument is not a new one. Prior to
this court's decision in Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc., supra, 39 Cal.3d 18, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 130, 702 P.2d 212, a few Court of
Appeal decisions had reasoned that if a
plaintiff, by the transparent device of
pleading an intention not to perform at the
time of entering into a contract, could avoid
statutory provisions designed to prevent
fraud like the statute of frauds, the statute
would be ineffective. However, mere
pleading of fraud is not sufficient; the
plaintiff must also prove fraud. In Tenzer
the court pointed out that the argument in
the Court of Appeal decisions assumes the
inability of a jury to distinguish between an
unkept but honest promise to perform and
one which the promisor never intended to
perform. As Justice Kaus observed in
Southern Cal etc. Assemblies of God v.
Shepherd of Hills etc. Church, supra, 77
Cal.App.3d 951, 958, footnote 3, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 46: "The law is otherwise. {People
v. Ashley (1954) 42 Cal.2d 246, 263-264 [267
P.2d 271].)" (39 CaL3d at p. 29, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 130, 702 P.2d 212.) In Tenzer, the
court concluded that the argument that
actual fraud must be permitted to effectuate a statute designed to prevent fraud was
invalid and disapproved the contrary cases.
(39 Cal.3d at pp. 29-31, 216 Cal.Rptr. 130,
702 P.2d 212.) In urging that the courts
must grant rewards to those who engage
in fraudulent conduct, the majority are
seeking to resurrect the cases disapproved
in Tenzer.
In fairness to the majority, I must recognize that they do not propose to prohibit all
actions for fraud brought by an unlicensed
contractor. The majority conclude that the
proper result was reached in each of the
cases, Grant, Brunzell, and Pickens,
where the Courts of Appeal held that the
cause of action for fraud by an unlicensed
contractor was not barred by section 7031.

HYDROTECH SYSTEMS v. OASIS WATERPARK

Cal.

383

Cite as 803 P.2d 370 (Cal. 1991)

(Maj- °Pn» <*nte> at p. 525 of 277 Cal.Rptr., tions of the complaint, plaintiff sought to
sell its wave-making product to defendant
a t p. 378 of 803 P.2d.) The majority state
that the distinction between those fraud without contracting to do the installation.
cases and the instant one is that "the pri- The sale obviously would not involve a violation of the contractor's licensing statute.
m ary fraud alleged in each case was exterIt was the defendants who insisted that
al
to
the
construction
work
as
such/'
D
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 525 of 277 Cal.Rptr., plaintiff engage in the installation of the
at p. 378 of 803 P.2d.) I am not sure what product and undertake work requiring a
the distinction is. In each case the claim license. When the lack of a contractor's
T
was that the owner or contractor did not license was raised, it w as the defendants
intend to perform. In each case the plain- who promised to arrange for a licensed
tiff was seeking to recover damages so far contractor, never intending to perform
as appears measured by the falsely prom- their promises. The basic agreement was
for the sale of the equipment, and under
ised performance.
the
test apparently established by the maIf the distinction sought to be made is
jority,
the construction and supervision serbetween fraud cases where the interest
vices
appear
to be collateral.
protected is collateral to the licensing law
and those where the code section is intended as the instrument of fraud, the majority^ priorities are misplaced, and even were
we to apply them, the majority reach the
wrong result on the facts of the case. As
between fraudulent wrongdoers who seek
to take advantage of their victims on the
basis of section 7031 and those who indulge
in other fraudulent conduct, the law should
be most concerned with those whose fraudulent schemes seek to take advantage of
the statute. Secondly, under the allega-

I cannot agree that wre should reward
fraudulent parties and I would affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeal.
PANELLI, J., concurs.
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LEWIS & QUEEN, a Partnership,

George W. Lewis and Paul C. Queen,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
tf. M. BALL SONS, a Partnership, et aL,
Defendants and Respondents.
S. F. 19563.

Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.
March 19, 1957.
Behearing Denied April 17, 1957.
Action for breach of rental agreements
to furnish equipment for performance of
work under defendant's parkway construction contracts with state, wherein defendant filed a counterclaim. The Superior
Court, Alameda County, Chris B. Fox, J.,
entered judgment for defendants, and from
such judgment and order denying a new
trial, plaintiff appealed. The Supreme
Court, Traynor, J., held that the plaintiff,
as subcontractor, had acted as a contractor
without being licensed as such, as required
by West's Ann.Bus. & Prof.Code, § 7028,
and hence, under § 7031, could not maintain action against principal contractor or
sureties on its bonds for breach of rental
agreements.
Appeal from order denying motion for
new trial dismissed and judgment affirmed.
Opinion, 297 P.2d 120, vacated
Carter and Schauer, JJ., dissented.
I. Highways <£=>II0
In action for breach of equipment
rental agreements by holder of parkway
construction contracts with state, findings
that plaintiff and defendant had entered
}ntt> T«rta\ agreements ioi the pmpose oi
circumventing requirement under state contracts that defendant must perform at least
50% of work embraced in state contracts
and that real agreement between the parties was for plaintiff to perform more than
50% of ^ o r k under state contracts as an
integrated subcontract operation in violation of state contracts were supported by
substantial evidence.
308 P.2d—45%

Order denying a new trial is not appealable but may be reviewed on appeal
from judgment. West's Ann.Code Civ.
Proa, § 956.
3. Licenses <S=?39.44
In action against holder of parkway
construction contracts with state and sureties on contractors bonds for breach of
equipment rental agreements, evidence established that, notwithstanding form of
rental agreements, plaintiff actually undertook to and did in fact construct a highway for contractor and thereby acted as
a contractor within meaning of statute
making it unlawful to engage in the business or act in the capacity of a contractor
without a license. West's Ann.Code Civ
Proa, § 1192.1; West's Ann.Gov.Code, §
4200; West's Ann.Bus. & Prof.Code, §§
7026, 7028, 7031.
4. Contracts ®=^346(l)
Where evidence shows that plaintiff
in substance seeks to enforce an illegal
contract or recover compensation for an
illegal act, court, regardless of the pleadings, has the power and duty to ascertain
the true facts in order that it may not lend
its assistance to the consummation or encouragement of what public policy forbids.
5. Appeal and Error <§=>I73(6)
Arbitration and Award <3=>85(l)
Contracts <S=M38(6)
New Trial <£=>26

The issue of illegality of contract
sought to be enforced or of act for which
recovery of compensation is sought may
be raised for the first time on motion for
new trial, in proceeding to enforce arbitration award, or on appeal, and, even though
parties, whether by inadvertence or consent, do not raise the issue, court may do
so on its own motion.
6. Evidence <§=»437
In action for breach of written agreements for rental of road construction
equipment, though such agreements stated
that they contained all provisions agreed
to by the parties, parol evidence was ad-
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missible to show true nature of agreement
between the parties and that plaintiff had
in fact acted as a contractor within statute
making it unlawful to do so without a license. West's Ann Code Civ.Proc, § 1856;
West's Ann Bus. & Prof.Code, §§ 7026,
7028, 7031.
7. Evidence <§=s437
Parol evidence rule does not exclude
evidence showing that a written contract
lawful on its face is in fact part of an
illegal transaction. West's Ann.Code Civ.
P r o a , § 1856.
& Contracts <S=*346(!)
Evidence <£=>437
The policy in favor of narrowing issues in dispute to those made by the pleadings, and the policy of parol evidence rule
favoring the conclusiveness of integrated
written agreements give way before the
importance of discouraging illegal conduct,
and trial court, notwithstanding such policies, must be free to search out illegality
lying behind the form in which the parties
have cast transaction to conceal such illegality.
9. Licenses <^!l(5)
Statutes regulating the contracting
business and providing for the licensing
of contractors were intended to protect the
public against dishonesty and incompetency
in the administration of contracting business as well as in the actual performance
of contract West's Ann.Bus. & Prof,
Code, §§ 7025, 7026, 7028-7031, 7068, 7069,
7120.
10. Licenses <£=>20
Where contractor is a partnership, the
experience, knowledge, and integrity of
each partner is a vital consideration in
determining whether to issue contractor's
license. West's Ann.Bus. & Prof.Code,
§§ 7025, 7026, 7028-7031, 7067, 7069, 7071.
11. Licenses <§=>39.43
That one of two members of partnership which acted as a contractor held a
contractor's license did not constitute substantial compliance with statutory licensing
requirements and did not enable partner-

ship to maintain action for breach of contract. West's Ann Bus. & Prof Code, §§
7025, 7026, 7028-7031, 7067-7069, 7071, 7120.
12. Contracts <§=*I38(1)

Generally, courts will not enforce an
illegal bargain or lend their assistance to
a person who seeks compensation for an
illegal act regardless of consequent injustice between the parties.
13. Contracts <&=>I38<!)
How the policy of deterring illegal
contracts can best be achieved depends on
the kind of illegality and the particular
facts involved.
14. Licenses <£=>39.43
Where highway subcontractor acted
as contractor without a license, fact that
principal contractor had been paid in full
for all work done under highway construction contract and should in justice be required to turn over to subcontractor proceeds from principal contract attributable
to subcontractor's work did not enable subcontractor to maintain action against principal contractor for breach of subcontract,
in view of statutory provision prohibiting
maintenance of action for compensation for
performance of any act or contract for
which a license is required without allegation and proof that party bringing action
was a licensed contractor during performance of act or contract. West's Ann.Bus.
& Prof.Code, §§ 7026, 7028, 7031.
15. Contracts <§=>139
Where statute is enacted for the purpose of protecting one class of persons
from the activities of another, a member
of protected class, though he has shared
in illegal transaction, is said not to be
in pari delicto and may maintain action
against a member of the class primarily
to be deterred.
16. Licenses <^39.43
The class protected by statute providing for the licensing of contractors includes those who deal with a person required by statute to have a license, and
where the person required to have a license
but having none is himself a subcontractor,
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he is not to be protected from his own unlicensed activities. West's Ann.Bus. &
Prof.Code, §§ 7026, 7028, 7031.
17. Licenses C=*39.43
Subcontractor, having acted as contractor without being licensed as such, as
required by statute, could not maintain action against principal contractor for breach
of subcontract on theory that principal
contractor was not a member of the class
to be protected by licensing statute. West's
Ann.Bus. & Prof.Code, §§ 7026, 7028, 7031.
18. Licenses <§=»39.43
Subcontractor, having acted as contractor without being licensed as such, as
required by statute, could not maintain action against principal contractor for breach
of subcontract on theory that principal
contractor was a licensed member of same
profession as subcontractor and not the
owner for whose ultimate benefit work was
done. West's Ann.Bus. & Prof.Code, §§
7026, 7028, 7031.
19. Licenses <§=>39.44
Action to enforce arbitration award or
foreclose mechanic's lien is an action within
meaning of statutory provision prohibiting
maintenance of any action on a contract
for which contractor's license is required
without allegation and proof that party
bringing action was a licensed contractor
during performance of contract. West's
Ann.Bus. & Prof.Code, §§ 7026, 7028, 7031.
20. Principal and Surety <&»I43
Defense of illegality of contract is
available to surety, if it is available to his
principal.
21. Licenses <§=»39.43
The obligation of sureties on labor
and material bonds and stop notice bonds
posted by holder of parkway construction
contract with state was to pay only if a
legal and valid claim for compensation
was established against principal contractor
without reference to bonds, and hence, since
subcontractor, having acted as contractor
without being licensed as such, as required
by statute, could not maintain action against
principal contractor for breach of subcon-

tract, such action could not be maintained
against sureties on principal contractor's
bonds. West's Ann.Code Civ.Proc, § 1192.1; West's Ann.Civ.Code, § 2810; West's
Ann.Gov.Code, § 4200; West's Ann.Bus.
& Prof.Code, §§ 7026, 7028, 7031.

Howard B. Crittenden, Jr., San Francisco, for appellants.
Thelen, Marrin, Johnson & Bridges,.
Gordon Johnson and Dario De Benedictis,.
San Francisco, for respondents.
TRAYNOR, Justice.
Plaintiffs George W. Lewis and Paul C
Queen are engaged in the contracting business as the partnership of Lewis and
Queen, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff.
Defendant Ball Sons, hereinafter referred
to as defendant, is also in the contracting
business.
In June, 1949, defendant was awarded
two contracts by the state, each contract
for the construction of a separate section
of the Hollywood Parkway. Defendant
then entered into four contracts with plaintiff. With respect to the work to be done
on each section of the parkway,, there were
two contracts between plaintiff and defendant. The first was entitled a "subcontract,"
and under it plaintiff agreed to remove concrete encountered during excavation of the
roadway and apply water needed in the
process of compacting the ground. The
second was entitled an "equipment rental
agreement," and under it plaintiff agreed
to provide defendant with construction
equipment for road excavation, "overhaul,"
and compacting.
Plaintiff brought this action for damages
for breach of the equipment rental agreements and for the reasonable rental value
of equipment alleged to have been held beyond the agreed rental term. Plaintiff also
sought to recover against sureties on labor
and material bonds posted by defendant in
compliance with Government Code section
4200 before commencing work on the parkway, and stop notice bonds posted by de-
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fendant pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1184e (now section 1192.1)
after the present dispute arose. Defendant answered denying that it had breached
the rental agreements, and filed a crosscomplaint in which it alleged a breach of
the agreements by plaintiff and sought to
recover overpayments made to plaintiff.
The trial court found that before the
execution of the rental agreements plaintiff and defendant had entered into an oral
agreement that plaintiff would undertake
as a single subcontract the removal of concrete, application of water, excavation,
overhaul, and compacting of original
ground. Defendant then discovered that
if it subcontracted all of this work, it would
violate provisions in its contracts with the
state that required it to perform with its
own organization work of a value of not
less than fifty per cent of the value of all
the work embraced in the state contracts.
The parties agreed therefore, with the intention of circumventing the provisions in
the state contracts, to divide the five items
of work under each state contract between
two writings, a subcontract and an equipment rental agreement. Notwithstanding
the form of these writings, it remained the
agreement of the parties that plaintiff
would perform all five items of work as
an integrated subcontract operation.
[1] There was substantial evidence to
support these findings. The rental agreements themselves provided for compensation based on the number of cubic yards
of earth moved or square yards compacted
rather than on the period of time during
which defendant had use of the equipment,
and the rental term was the time required
to do the work called for by the state contracts. Testimony indicated that plaintiff
furnished and retained control over both
operating and supervisory employees, that
it moved equipment to and from other jobs
without defendant's consent, and that it
carried on the work under both subcontracts and rental agreements with the same
I. It also purports to appeal from an order denying a new trial. Such an order la not appealable, but may be re-

personnel, equipment, and accounting. Defendant paid wages, payroll taxes, and compensation insurance for employees operating the machines, but these costs were
charged against amounts owing plaintiff
under the rental agreements and so ultimately were borne by it. Monthly progress
reports from defendant to plaintiff were
on a single form and made no segregation
between charges attributable to work under
the rental agreements and charges attributable to work under the subcontracts. The
evidence, especially the testimony of Stanley Ball, tended to show that for all practical purposes the work was conducted by
plaintiff, and that defendant exercised only
such control as was necessary to coordinate
the various subcontractors working on the
parkway.
[2] The trial court concluded that plaintiff had agreed to act and had in fact acted
as a contractor within the meaning of section 7026 of the Business and Professions
Code, and that because it had done so without the license required by section 7028, it
was barred by section 7031 from maintaining any action for compensation. Lewis
"had an individual license, but neither
Queen nor the partnership of Lewis and
Queen had licenses. The court held, in
the alternative, that the rental agreements
were unenforceable because they violated
the provisions in the state contracts against
subcontracting more than a certain amount
of the total work. Since we have concluded
that plaintiffs failure to obtain a license
prevented it from maintaining any action
for compensation, we have no cause to consider this alternative ground. The court
entered judgment for defendant on the
complaint and for plaintiff on the crosscomplaint. Plaintiff appeals from the judgment against it. 1
Section 7028 of the Business and Professions Code makes it unlawful for "any
person to engage in the business or act in
the capacity of a contractor within this
viewed on an appeal from a judgment
Code Civ.Proc. § 956.
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State without having a license therefor
* * *." Section 7026 defines a contractor
as "any person, who * * * does himself
or by or through others construct, alter,
repair, add to, subtract from, improve,
move, wreck or demolish any building, highway, road
* * * or improvement
* * *." "The term contractor includes
subcontractor
* * *." Section 7030
rnakes it a misdemeanor for any person to
act in the capacity of a contractor without
a license. Section 7031 provides that, "No
person engaged in the business or acting in
the capacity of a contractor, may bring or
maintain any action in any court of this
State for the collection of compensation
for the performance of any act or contract
for which a license is required by this
chapter without alleging and proving that
he was a duly licensed contractor at all
times during the performance of such act
or contract."
Furthermore, section 7025 states that the
"person" required to have a license by section 7028 includes a partnership, and sec*
tion 7029 makes it unlawful for two in*
dividuals, "each of whom has been issued
a license to engage separately in the business * * * of a contractor * * * to
jointly * * * act in the capacity of a
contractor * * * without first having
secured an additional license for acting in
the capacity of such a joint venture or
combination * * *."
[3] The evidence shows that in spite of
the form of the rental agreements plaintiff
actually undertook to and did in fact "construct a highway" for defendant, and thereby acted as a contractor within the meaning
of section 7026. See Albaugh v. Moss
Const. Co., 125 Cal.App.2d 126, 132-133,
269 P.2d 936; Phillips v. Mcintosh, 51 Cal.
App.2d 340, 343, 124 P.2d 835; cf. Harrison
v. Shamalian, 110 Cal.App.2d 500, 243 P.2d
S2; Andrew v. Conner, 101 Cal.App.2d 621,
225 P.2d 943.
[4,5] Plaintiff contends, however, that
because defendant admitted in its answer
that equipment had been furnished under
the written rental agreements, the trial court

was precluded from finding that the actual
agreements were subcontracts because it
should have restricted its findings to the
issues made by the pleadings. There is
no merit in this contention. Whatever
the state of the pleadings, when the evidence shows that the plaintiff in substance
seeks to enforce an illegal contract or recover compensation for an illegal act, the
court has both the power and duty to ascertain the true facts in order that it may
not unwittingly lend its assistance to the
consummation or encouragement of what
public policy forbids. Wells v. Comstock,
46 CaUd 528, 532, 297 P.2d 961; Franklin
v. Nat C. Goldstone Agency, 33 Cal.2d 628,
629, 204 P.2d 37; Fewel & Dawes, Inc., v.
Pratt, 17 Cal2d 85, 92, 109 P.2d 650; Endicott v. Rosenthal, 216 Cal. 721, 728, 16 P.2d
673; Tevis v. Blanchard, 122 Cal.App.2d
731, 732-734, 266 P.2d 85; see Owens v.
Haslett, 98 Ca!.App.2d 829, 835-836, 221
P.2d 252. It is immaterial that the parties,
whether by inadvertence or consent, even
at the trial do not raise the issue- The
court may do so of its own motion when
the testimony produces evidence of illegality. Norwood v. Judd, 93 Cal.App.2d 276,
277-278, 282, 209 P.2d 24. It is not too
late to raise the issue on motion for new
trial, Pacific Wharf & Storage Co. v.
Standard American Dredging Co., 184 Gal.
21, 23-24, 192 P. 847, in a proceeding to'
enforce an arbitration award, Franklin v.
Nat C Goldstone Agency, 33 Cal2d 628,
629, 204 P.2d 37, or even on appeal. Morey
v. Paladini, 187 Cal. 727, 733-734, 203 P.
760. In the present case the issue was in
fact raised during the trial.
[6-8] Equally without merit is plaintiffs
contention that because the rental agreements stated that they contained all provisions agreed to by the parties, the parol
evidence rule precluded the admission of
other evidence showing the true nature of
the agreement between the parties and that
plaintiff had in fact acted as a contractor.
The parol evidence rule does not exclude
evidence showing that a contract lawful
on its face is in fact part of an illegal transaction. Code Civ.Proc. § 1856; Endicott
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v. Rosenthal, 216 Cal. 721, 728, 16 P.2d 673;
May v. Herron, 127 Cal.App.2d 707, 710711, 274 R2d 484; Kennerson v. Salih
Brothers, 123 Cal.App.2d 371, 374, 266 P.2d
871; De Armas v. Dickerman, 108 Cal.App.
2d 548, 551-552, 239 P.2d 65. The policy in
favor of narrowing the issues in dispute,
which normally confines the court to those
made by the pleadings, and the policy of
the parol evidence rule favoring the conclusiveness of integrated written agreements, both give way before the importance
of discouraging illegal conduct. To this
end, the trial court must be free to search
out illegality lying behind the forms in
which the parties have cast the transaction
to conceal such illegality.
Plaintiff contends that even if it acted
as a contractor under section 7026, it substantially complied with* the requirement
of section 7028, since Lewis held an individual license. The "person" that did the
contracting work, and was required by
section 7028 to have a license, however, was
the partnership of Lewis and Queen, and
it had no license. Nor did Queen individually. Section 7029, furthermore, expressly
requires individual licensees who engage
jointly in'the contracting business to obtain
an additional joint license. Cf. Joeph V.
Drew, 36 Cal.2d 575, 578, 225 P.2d 504;
Wise v. Radis, 74 Cal.App. 765, 773, 242 P.
90.
Undoubtedly there are situations in which
substantial compliance with the licensing
requirements satisfies the policy r of the
statute. See Gatti v. Highland Park Builders, Inc., 27 Cal.2d 687, 689-694, 166 P.2d
265; Citizens State Bank of Long Beach v.
Gentry, 20 Cal.App.2d 415, • 419-420, 67
P.2d 364; ci. Oddo v. Htdde, 101 CaLApp.
2d 375, 225 P.2d 929. The facts of the
present case, however, with one partner
licensed individually and no partnership
license, are precisely those in Loving &
Evans v. Blick, 33 Ca!.2d 603, 204 P.2d
23, 25, and in that case we said, "There
can be no question but that this case presents a clear violation of the statutes regulating the contracting business." 33 Cal.2d
at page 607, 204 P.2d at page 25; see also

Kirman v. Borzage, 65 Cal.App.2d 156,
158-159, 150 P.2d 3 ; Holm v. Bramwell,
20 Cal.App.2a 332, 335-336, 67 P.2d 114.
We distinguished Gatti v. Highland Park
Builders, Inc., supra, on the ground that
there both partners held individual licenses
and during the performance of the contract
a joint license was issued to them and a
third person, and Citizens State Bank of
Long Beach v. Gentry, supra, on the ground
that in that case, although the plaintiff's
license expired while the work was in progress, it was renewed in the name of a corporation controlled by him.
[9-11] In both the Gatti and Gentry
cases, any matter that might have formed
the subject of inquiry by the licensing
board in determining whether to issue an
additional license was necessarily considered in connection with the licenses actually
issued. In the present case, however, the
board has never determined the qualifications of Queen. Plaintiff claims that this
makes no difference, because it was Lewis
who supervised the actual construction
work and Queen merely kept the books and
sought out new business for the partnership. But the statutory provisions setting
forth the qualifications for a license, and
the causes for disciplinary action against
licensees, show that the Legislature was as
much concerned to protect the public from
dishonesty and incompetence in the administration of the contracting business as
in the actual use of bricks, mortar, and
earth-moving equipment. E.g., §§ 7068,
7069, 7120. Plaintiff's insistence that Queen
knew nothing about actual construction simply emphasizes the importance of the
board's passing on his qualifications to engage m any aspect oi the contracting business. The statute makes it clear, furthermore that if the contractor is a partnership,
the experience, knowledge, and integrity
of each partner is a vital consideration in
determining whether to issue a license.
E.g., §§ 7067, 7069, 7071. Finally, it is not
clear that Queen's activities were in fact
confined to bookkeeping and the search
for new business. He participated with
Lewis in the negotiations that led to the
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execution of the contracts, and he "walked
the job," apparently to determine what
problems would be encountered if the work
w as undertaken. The conclusion is inescapable that plaintiff did not substantially
comply with the licensing requirements.
Since plaintiff did not comply with the
statute, it cannot "bring or maintain any
action in any court of this State for the
collection of compensation * * V §
7031; Loving & Evans v. Blick, 33 Cal.2d
603, 204 P.2d 23. Plaintiff contends, nevertheless, that because defendant has been
paid in full by the state for all work done
on the parkway, justice requires that it be
compelled to turn over to plaintiff the proceeds from the state contracts attributable
to plaintiffs labor.
[12] One answer to this contention
is that, even in the absence of a provision
such as section 7031, the courts generally
will not enforce an illegal bargain or
lend their assistance to a party who seeks
compensation for an illegal act. The reason for this refusal is not that the courts
are unaware of possible injustice between
the parties, and that the defendant may
be left in possession of some benefit he
should in good conscience turn over to
the plaintiff, but that this consideration is
outweighed by the importance of deterring
illegal conduct. Knowing that they will
receive no help from the courts and must
trust completely to each other's good faith,
the parties are less likely to enter an illegal arrangement in the first place. See
Takeuchi v. Schmuck, 206 Cal. 782, 7867%7t 276 P. 345; May v. Herron, 127 Cal.
App.2d 707, 712, 274 P.2d 484; Orlinoff
v. Campbell, 91 Cal.App.2d 382, 388, 205
P.2d 67; Wise v. Radis. 74 Cal.App. 765,
77%, 242 P. 90; Grodecki, In Pari Delicto
Potior Est Conditio Defendentis, 71 L.Q.
Rev. 254, 266-268.
[13,14] In some cases, on the other
hand, the statute making the conduct illegal,
in providing for a fine or administrative
discipline excludes by implication the additional penalty involved in holding the il-

legal contract unenforceable; or effective
deterrence is best realized by enforcing
the plaintiffs claim rather than leaving
the defendant in possession of the benefit;
or the forfeiture resulting from unenforceability is disproportionately harsh considering the nature of the illegality. In
each such case, how the aims of policy
can best be achieved depends on the kind
of illegality and the particular facts involved. See Wilson v. Stearns, 123 Cal.
App.2d 472, 481-482, 267 P.2d 59; John
E. Rosasco Creameries, Inc., v. Cohen, 276
N.Y. 274, 278-280, 11 N.E.2d 908, 118 A.L.
R. 641; 6 Corbin, Contracts 964-967
(1951); 2 Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence
137 (5th ed. 1941); Grodecki, In Pari Delicto Potior Est Conditio Defendentis, 71
L.Q.Rev. 254, 268. But we are not free
to weigh these considerations in the present case. Section 7031 represents a legislative determination that the importance
of deterring unlicensed persons from engaging in the contracting business outweighs any harshness between the parties,
and that such deterrence can best be realized by denying violators the right to maintain any action for compensation in the
courts of the state. Kirman v. Borzage,
65 Cal.App.2d 156, 158, 150 PJ2d 3. Moreover, even if we could take into account
unjust enrichment of defendant, it is not
at all clear that, had it reached the issue,
the trial Court would have found defendant indebted to plaintiff beyond what it
had already paid.
Norwood v. Judd, 93 Cal.App2d 276, 209
P.2d 24, Galich v. Brkich, 103 Cal A pp.
2d 187, 229 P.2d 89, and Wold v. Luigi Consentino & Sons, 109 Cal.App.2d 854, 241
P.2d 1032, do not support plaintiffs right
to recover. Each of those cases involved
an action by a partner or joint venturer
to recover a share of profits arising from
an illegal enterprise. It was held that,
since the enterprise was terminated, since
it was not illegal as such but only for want
of a license, and since the action was not
against a third person for whose protection the statute had been primarily
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enacted but against a partner or joint
venturer, the purpose of the law would
not be served by denying relief. W e need
not decide at this time whether an action
for an accounting against a partner or
joint venturer is "an action * * * for
the collection of compensation" within
section 7031, cf. Wise v. Radis, 74 Cal.
App. 765, 775, 242 P. 90, or, even if it is
not, whether the indirect encouragement
of an illegal enterprise resulting from the
allowance of such an action is sufficient to
outweigh the evil of unjust enrichment
See Hooper v. Barranti, 81 Cal.App.2d 570,
575-578, 184 P.2d 688; 32 A.L.R.2d 1345,
1387; Wade, Restitution of Benefits Acquired Through Illegal Transactions, 95
U.Pa.L.Rev. 261, 294-296; but see Denning v. Taber, 70 CalApp.2d 253, 257-260,
160 P.2d 900. The present action is
against a third party, and is to enforce directly an illegal contract not merely to
obtain an accounting for profits arising
from one. As Norwood v. Judd itself
recognizes, this situation falls squarely
within section 7031. 93 Cal.App.2d 276,
283, 209 P.2d 24.
Plaintiff next contends that, by virtue of
the fact that it is a subcontractor suing a
general contractor rather than a general
contractor suing an owner, neither section
7031 nor the general rule that illegal contracts are unenforceable bars its action.
Matchett v. Gould, 131 Cal.App.2d 821, 281
P.2d 524, appears* to make this distinction
decisive. In that case the Crane Service
Company and the defendants, all unlicensed contractors, decided to undertake the
demolition of buildings for a school district. The understanding between Crane
and the defendants was that Crane would
make the bid and defendants supply the
funds to pay the school district; that the
defendants would then do the actual work
of taking down the bricks, using for this
purpose Crane's machines, for which a
reasonable rental would be paid; the defendants would pay Crane for removing
concrete and rough-grading the site, and
all salvageable material would belong to
the defendants. After the job was com-

pleted and the defendants had received all
the revenues from the sale of salvage, they
refused to pay Crane. Crane's assignee
sued to enforce the contract.
The district court of appeal held that
the plaintiff could recover in spite of section 7031. The first ground of its decision
appears to be that, unless the plaintiff was
allowed to recover the defendants would
be unjustly enriched. As we have already
pointed out, the courts may not resort to
equitable considerations in defiance of
section 7031. As an alternative ground,
the court reasoned that Crane had in effect assigned the school district contract
to defendants and then become their subcontractor; that subcontractors are in a
class for whose protection the licensing
statute was enacted (relying on our statement in Fraenkel v. Bank of America, 40
Cal.2d 845, 848, 256 P.2d 569, that the
statute was designed "for the prevention
of fraudulent acts by contractors resulting in loss to subcontractors, materialmen,
employees, and owners of structures");
and that therefore a subcontractor can
maintain an action on a contract with a
general contractor, even though it is an
illegal contract, because the subcontractor
is not considered in pari delicto. 131 Cal.
App.2d at page 829, 281 P 2 d at page 526.
[15] It is true that when the Legislature enacts a statute forbidding certain
conduct for the purpose of protecting one
class of persons from the activities of another, a member of the protected class may
maintain an action notwithstanding the
fact that he has shared in the illegal transaction. The protective purpose of the
legislation is realized by allowing the
plaintiff to maintain his action against a
defendant within the class primarily to be
deterred. In this situation it is said that
the plaintiff is not in pari delicto. Carter
v. Seaboard Finance Co., 33 CaL2d 564,
574, 203 P.2d 758; McAllister v. Drapeau,
14 Cal.2d 102, 112, 92 P.2d 911, 125 A.L.R.
800; Pollak v. Staunton, 210 Cal. 656, 662663, 293 P. 26; Elmers v. Shapiro, 91 Cal.
App.2d 741, 754, 205 P.2d 1052; see Grodecki, In Pari Delicto Potior Est Conditio
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Defendentis, 71 L.Q.Rev. 254, 265; Wade,
Restitution of Benefits Acquired Through
Illegal Transactions, 95 U.Pa.L.Rev. 261,
268-270.

as owners are entitled to raise the defense
of lack of a license in the subcontractor.
If they were not, section 7031 would be
no deterrent to subcontractors, since they
generally do look to the general contractor
for compensation. Yet section 7026, stating
that "the term contractor includes subcontractor," clearly imposes on unlicensed subcontractors the same disabilities as on unlicensed general contractors. Cases from
other jurisdictions cited by plaintiff, e.
g., Dow v. United States, for Use and Benefit of HoJJey, 10 Cir., 154 F.2d 707, 710,
do not involve statutory prohibitions like
section 7031.

[16,17] But subcontractors are not
always in the class to be protected simply
because they are subcontractors, and we
did not suggest otherwise in Fraenkel v.
Bank of America, 40 Cal.2d 845, 848, 256
P.2d 569. See Albaugh v. Moss Const
Co., 125 Cal.App.2d 126, 132, 269 P.2d 936;
Holm v. Bramwell, 20 Cal.App.2d 332, 67
P.2d 114. The class protected by the statute includes those who deal with a person
required by the statute to have a license.
[19] Plaintiffs final contention is that,
When the person required to have a license is a general contractor, then the pro- even if it cannot recover on the rental
tected class includes subcontractors, ma- agreements from defendant, the defense of
terialmen, employees, and owners dealing lack of a license is not available to the
with the general contractor.
However, sureties on the bonds. Section 7031 prowhen the person who was required to have vides, however, that no person who acts as
a license but did not have one is himself a contractor "may bring or maintain any
a subcontractor, such as plaintiff in the action * * * for the collection of compresent case, he of course is not to be pro- pensation for the performance of any act
tected from his own unlicensed activities. * * * " for which a license is required,
To allow him to recover would in fact de- without alleging and proving that he was
stroy the protection of those who dealt licensed. (Italics added.) We have alwith him, and they are in the class the ready held that an action to enforce an
Legislature intended to protect whether arbitration award is an action within the
they are owners or general contractors. meaning of this provision, Loving & Evans
Cf. Hedlund v. Sutter Medical Service v. Blick, 33 Cal.2d 603, 613, 204 P.2d 23;
Co., 51 Cal.App.2d 327, 333, 124 P.2d 878; Franklin v. Nat C. Goldstone Agency, 33
2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence 142 (5th Cal.2d 628, 631-633, 204 P2d 37, and it is
ed. 1941). To the extent that it is con- clear that an action to foreclose a metrary, the reasoning of Matchett v. Gould, chanic's lien is also. Albaugh v. Moss
131 Cal.App.2d 821, 281 P.2d 524, is er- Const Co., 125 Cal.App.2d 126, 132, 269
roneous and is disapproved. Under the P.2d 936; Cash v. Blackett, 87 Cal.App.2d
facts of the present case plaintiff is not in 233, 237, 196 P.2d 585; Siemens v. Meconi,
the class to be protected, and therefore, is 44 CaI.App.2d 641, 112 P.2d 904; Holm v.
not relieved from the imputation of being Bramwell, 20 CalApp^d 332, 334, 67 P.2d
114. In view of the purpose of section
in pari delicto. Its failure to obtain a license, and not any fault of defendant in 7031, we can see no reason to distinguish
this regard, made the transaction illegal. an action on a bond. In all of these cases
the object of the plaintiff is to obtain, more
[18] There is no merit in plaintiffs or hss directly, compensation for unlifurther contention that it may maintain censed work. The deterrent purpose bethis action simply because it is an action hind section 7031 would be frustrated if
against a licensed member of plaintiffs the plaintiff, prevented from obtaining
own profession, rather than against the compensation directly by an action on his
owner for whose ultimate benefit the work contract, could obtain it indirectly by an
was done. General contractors as much action on a bond.
308 P.2d—46
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[20,21] Moreover, even in the absence
of section 7031, the defense of illegality is
available to the surety if it is available to
his principal. Wells v. Comstock, 46 Cal.
2d 528, 529, 533, 297 P.2d 961; Restatement, Security § 117, comment d. Lewis
& Queen v. S. Edmondson & Sons, 113
Cal.App.2d 705, 707-708, 248 P.2d 973, and
Pneucrete Corp. v. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co., 7 Cal.App.2d 733, 736740, 46 P.2d 1000, which are cited by plaintiff, in spite of broad language in the opinions do not hold otherwise. The obligation
of the sureties on defendant's bonds was
not to pay for labor merely by virtue of
the fact that it had been expended on the
parkway. It was an obligation to pay
only if plaintiff established, without reference to the bond, a legal and valid claim
for compensation. See Civil Code, § 2810;
Flickinger v. Swedlow Engineering Co.,
45 Cal.2d 388, 393-394, 289 P.2d 214; Restatement, Security § 117, comment c,
This plaintiff has not done.
Appeal from order denying motion for
new trial dismissed. Judgment affirmed.
SHENK, SPENCE and McCOMB, JJ. t
concur.
CARTER, Justice*
I dissent
I n my opinion, the strict construction
placed upon Business and Professions Code
sections, particularly section 7031, by the
majority is unwarranted. Section 7031 is
but a statutory declaration of the common
law rule that a contract which violates a
statute designated for the protection of the
public is void and unenforceable. Levinson
v. Boas, 150 Cal. 185, 88 P . S25, 12 L.R.A.,
N.S., 575; Berka v. Woodward, 125 Cal.
119, 57 P. 777, 45 L.R.A. 420; 12 Am.Jur.,
Contracts, § 158, p. 652. This rule, however, is not applied where to do so does not
serve the intended purpose of the statute.
Wilson v. Steams, 123 Cal.App2d 472, 478,
267 P.2d 59, citing Harris v. Runnels, 12
How. 79, 13 L.Ed. 901; 12 Am.Jur., Contracts, § 162. p. 657. At one time in this
state, statutes, such as section 7031, which

expressly deny the enforcement of contracts
which violate a particular law, were strictly
construed to prevent recovery. See, e. g.,
Wise v. Radis, 74 Cal.App. 765, 242 P. 90,
involving a statute which prevented the enforcement of certain contracts by unlicensed
real estate brokers. More recently, however, section 7031, although literally applicable, has not been applied where enforcement of the contract was considered
not to be adverse to the public interest
sought to be protected by the pertinent Business and Professions Code sections. Gatti
v. Highland Park Builders, Inc., 27 Cal.2d
687, 166 P.2d 265; Citizens State Bank v.
Gentry, 20 CaLApp.2d 415, 67 P.2d 364;
Norwood v. Judd, 93 Cal.App.2d 276, 209
P.2d 24; Galich v. Brkich, 103 Cal.App.2d
187, 229 P.2d 89; Wold v. Luigi Consentino
& Sons, 109 Cal.App.2d 854, 241 P.2d 1032;
Matchett v. Goxrid, 131 Cal.App.2d 821, 281
P.2d 524. The effect of these cases is that
the common law exceptions to the rule are
recognized as being preferable to a strict,
literal construction of the statutory language. Accordingly, the conclusion of the
majority—that because plaintiff is within
the statutory definition (subcontractor) and
seeks recovery of his share of the proceeds
arising from the work, it necessarily follows that recovery must be denied—is based
upon an incomplete analysis of the question
presented. Rather, an examination should
be made to determine whether the intended
statutory purpose requires the denial of
enforcement of this particular contract.
Such an examination, it is submitted,
demonstrates that the statute was not so
intended.
The facts of this case are quite similar
to those in Norwood v. Judd, supia. TheTe,
plaintiff and defendant had formed a
partnership to conduct a contracting business. Defendant was a duly licensed contractor but neither plaintiff nor the partnership was. Plaintiff brought an action to
recover his share of the business proceeds
from his partner. Literally, Business and
Professions Code, section 7031, would have
barred plaintiffs action as it provides, in
part, that: "No person engaged in the
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business or acting in the capacity of a illegal agreement should not be 'blindly' ex/^tractor, may brinjr or maintain ajjy tended 'to every case where illegality apaction * * * for the collection of cor^. pears somewhere in the transaction.' " Depensation for the performance of any act fendant's petition for a hearing in this court
or contract for which a license is require was denied.
by this chapter without alleging and provIn Wold v. Luigi Consentino & Sons,
ing that he was a duly licensed contractor
at all tunes during the performance of su^h supra, 109 Cal App 2d 854, 241 P2d 1032,
act or contract." However, recovery w^s the same problem was again presented.
allowed and the court declared, 93 Cal App# The application of the statute was rejected,
2d at page 286, 209 P2d at page 30 th*t the court declaring 109 Cal App2d at page
"It must be remembered that these licensing 857/241 P2d 1032; that its W i n purpose
statutes are passed primarily for the pr^. was protection of owners.
tection and safety of the public They a**e
not passed lor the benefit of a greecjy c Recovery was /allowed " in* these cases
partner who seeks to keep for himself %[\ because the actions were not against those
of the fruits of the partnership enterprise whom the statute was intended to protect,
to the exclusion of another partner e^. that is, an owner or other member oftthe
titled to share therein. Where the illegal general public who is without knowledge of
transaction has been' terminated, publjc or experience in contracting affairs, and
policy is not protected or served by denying hence, is wholly dependent upon the comone partner relief against the other/' J^ petence of the contractor. Accordingly, the
was further not eof, 93 C&CApp 2d at page 'statute wasrnot applied to allow a&associate
288, 209 P.2d 24, that Wise v. Radis, supr^ of an unlicensed individual to retain the
(applying the strict rule of construction) proceeds rightfully owing to the latter. It
had been overruled in legal effect. D^. .seems clear that this principle is applicable
fendant's petition for a hearing in the No*, herey despite the absence of a partnership
or joint venture relationship/ for in practiwooji case was denied by this court.
cal effect, the circumstances are identical.
Two parties agreed to perform work for a
A similar problem was presented i^ third party and one of the two has withGalich y. Brkich, supra, 103 Cal.App.2d 18># held
* *% X^t
the "other's share/ of tne
the'pVoceeds.
229 V3A $9. Plaintiff, apparently an vu\l Upon' facts identical to tnose in the'fJresent
licensed contractor, entered into a joi% case, the Second district Court of Appeal
venture, or partnership agreement with d*. in Matchett v. Gould? supra,
fendant JNP license was obtained for th^ 821, 281 P.2d 524, applied the principle of
enterprise as required by Business an^j the partnership cases and allowed recovery.
Professions Code, section 7029. In allowing In that case, neither plaintiff, d subconrecovery by plaintiff of the money due hir^ tractor, nor defendant, a general contractor,
for the contracting work performed by tht was licensed. Upon completion of a conventure, the court declared 103 Cal App 2$ tracting job for a third party, plaintiff
at page 191, 229 P 2d at page 91, that "Th^ sought the amount owing to him for the
contract in question was not per se con. work performed. Analogizing to Norwood
tr<£/y te *2?y steteie; pub))c 7re)l#se &?<$K. fuddr suprat the court allowed recovery
safety were not threatened, and public and declared that the precise' relationship
policy would not be protected or -serveq between the parties, that is, whether partby denying one partner relief against th^ ners or contractor' and subcontractor, was
other." Applying the reasoning of tht not determinative and that the statute was
Norwood case, supra, the court observe^ not intended to prevent recovery where the
that "* * * the rule that courts wil\ unlicensed contractor has completed the
not lend their aid to the enforcement of aif job, where there is no serious moral turpi-
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tude involved and where a denial of recovery would permit unjust enrichment of
one not intended to be protected, namely,
the general contractor. Citing Gatti v.
Highland Park Builders, Inc., supra, 27 Cal.
2d 687, 166 P.2d 265, the court observed
131 Cal App 2d at page 829,281 P.2d at page
529, that the statute was not intended as an
" 'unwarranted shield for the avoidance of
a just obligation.'"
Here, the majority, to sustain their decision that plaintiff is precluded from en*
forcing his contract, concludes that the
reasoning of Matchett v. Gould, supra, is
erroneous, although a petition for hearing
in that case was denied by this court. The
majority opinion further declares that "To
allow him [plaintiff] to recover would in
fact destroy the protection of those who
dealt with him, and they are, in the class
the Legislature intended to protect whether they are owners or general contractors."
What protection is to be afforded a general
contractor? He is not in the position of a
member of the public who desires contracting work performed and because of the
disparity of knowledge and experience is
extended statutory protection. Rather, his
position is equal to that of the subcontractor
and he is, therefore, able to judge the nature
and quality of the subcontractor's performance for himself. If the statute was
intended to "protect" a general contractor as
a member of the public, as undeniably he is,
then it should be applied to "protect," from
one another, members of partnership which
has illegally undertaken contracting work.
It has been seen, however, that the statute
is not construed in such a fashion. In the
interests of just and consistent application,
it should not be so construed here. For
this reason, I would reverse the judgment
and remand the case for a determination
of the cause on its merits.
SCHAUER, J., concurs.
Rehearing
denied;
CARTER
SCHAUER, J J , dissenting.
GIBSON, C. J., not participating.

Felix BARRERA and Doleres Barrert,
his wife, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Armondo A. DE LA TORRE, Defendant
and Respondent.
L. A. 23875.

Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.
March 22, 1957.

Action by dwelling owners against
motorist for injuries to person and property resulting when motorist's automobile
struck dwelling. The Superior Court, Los
Angeles County, Ellsworth Meyer, J.,
entered judgment on verdict for defendant,
and owners appealed. The Supreme Court,
Spence, J., held that question of motorist's
negligence was for jury.
Judgment affirmed.
Carter, J., dissented.
Opinion, 300 P.2d 100, vacated.

1. Negligence <S=>I2I(2)
For doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to be
applicable, the accident must be of kind
which ordinarily does not occur in absence of negligence, must have been caused
by an agency or instrumentality within defendant's exclusive control, and must not
have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on part of plaintiff,
2. Appeal and Error <&=>2I6(I)
Automobiles <£=>246(60)
In action by dwelling owners against
motorist for injuries to person and property resulting when motorist's automobile
struck dwelling, evidence would have warranted instruction on doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, but owners, who had not requested such instruction, could not argue on
appeal that trial court erred in failing to
givt a specific instruction thereon,

and
3. Appeal and Error <§=>277
Upon appeal from judgment for defendant, plaintiffs, who had not complained

